This booklet is about nuclear waste disposal, and also about how society deals with important social issues involving scientific and technical problems. The audience to whom this work is directed is. the general public. The geologic and entire scientific communities are awakening to the fact that our communication of scientific observations and interpretations to the general public is inadequate. Scientific societal issues are complex and challenging. This booklet seeks to address these issues under the guise of nuclear waste disposal. Given the nature of the problem, this work is not comprehensive and all inclusive.

To the residents of the El Paso-Juarez region, the idea of nuclear waste is very remote. High electric rates enforce the realization that the El Paso Electric Company draws some of the electricity for El Paso, Juarez, and Las Cruces, from the Palo Verde nuclear plant west of Phoenix, Arizona. Few realize that hospitals and research institutions generate a large amount of the low-level nuclear waste, which is at issue here. In Texas, most of the waste to be buried was generated in the eastern and southeastern parts of the state.

The residents of the El Paso-Juarez region should understand ideas contained in the map, Figure 1. The proposed Fort Hancock Low-Level Nuclear Waste Site has arbitrarily been moved 50 mi further east, because El Paso yelled loudly. The placement of this burial site somewhere in west Texas is a foregone conclusion. Please take the time yourself to place on Figure 1 the location of the future low-level site near Sierra Blanca. You should know where it is.

Not well known to the general public is the fact that Mexico has already established and carried out a nuclear burial south of Juarez. In 1982, the largest radiation accident in North America happened in Juarez, Mexico, and, once discovered, the contaminated rebar (reinforcing steel used in construction, furniture and other uses) was buried in the desert sands southwest of
Samalayuca, Chihuahua (see Fig. 1).

Finally, another nuclear waste site exists in the El Paso-Juarez region, and that is the WIPP Site near Carlsbad, New Mexico, designated by the U.S. Department of Energy, for low-level radioactive waste (Fig. 1) and for radioactive material generated by the Department of Defense in bomb manufacture. This is referred to by Dennis Powers in Chapter 3.

The El Paso-Juarez area is isolated from the rest of their respective countries and states, and a paranoid person might view Figure 1 and decide that the region was being unjustly put upon. The possibility of such political maneuvering cannot be denied. General scientific reasons do exist for the concentration of nuclear waste sites as illustrated in Figure 1. Perhaps the most important thing is the lack of rainfall. In addition, there is the small population density. Finally, the potential of danger from radiation damage from a low-level waste site is less than potential damage from a hazardous waste site. Legally, low-level sites have to plan for 400 years in the future, a time during which the radioactive isotopes, which have short half lives, have largely disintegrated and are no longer harmful. An additional potential danger, however, is that the radioactive material disintegrates into heavy metals such as lead which themselves are toxic. Dispersion and redistribution of this material must be better understood. However, in hazardous waste sites, many dangerous chemical do not have half lives -- they last forever. Chromium, lead and mercury do not disintegrate.

Radioactivity and other things nuclear are topics which draw more fear than respect from the general public, although it is a useful phenomena in most hospitals and used in much scientific research. This is an area where it is believed that the nuclear industry has an unfulfilled mission of education.

When a radioactive chemical element decays, it changes into a lighter element called the "daughter". Energy is given off in this process in several different forms. The rate of decay is the half-life. Most rocks have a small amount of radioactivity. These concepts are illustrated in Figure 2a and Figure 2b. This energy can be beneficial by generating electricity or curing cancer, or it can be destructive as in a bomb or as a contaminant to the environment. The extensive use of radioactivity by society creates radioactive waste. Society has in general not decided where to bury this waste, and the present booklet is about this decision process.

Danger from the waste can be of two forms: 1) damage, genetic change, or death to biologic species, including humans, from the high energy radioactivity, and 2) toxicity of radioactive or daughter metals and gases.

The burial of nuclear waste is idealized in Figure 3, whereas Figure 4a and Figure 4b, and Figure 5, illustrate potential interruptions to quiet burial caused by the geological hazards of the region. These hazards include earthquakes and faulting, volcanic eruptions, rainfall and flooding, groundwater movement, and a rising water table level. Questions about the degree of likelihood of each of these potential hazards creates geological controversy.

A statement of the general nuclear waste problem is presented in the next chapter of this booklet, a reprint of an article in Geotimes, the "Time" magazine of geology. Low- and high-level nuclear waste are different problems, and it is only low-level waste which is being considered for west Texas. Aspects of the waste site selection process are given in chapter IV by Dr. Dennis Powers, who has 16 years of experience in helping to solve various nuclear waste problems. Additional information is given CHAPTER IX.

As stated above, this booklet is about how scientific data is transferred to the general public, and how successfully the transfer and its understanding are accomplished. Chapters III, V, and VI are directed towards these issues, as seen through the minds of three professors at UT El Paso. They have done an excellent job presenting their work on this most interesting question. Issues such as these are vital to our society today. Our dysfunctional family (Chapter V) must develop better contemplative and communicative activities, and free ourselves of the burdens of such extreme self-centeredness. The common good is a democratic value upon which we should have more focus.

Upon completion of this booklet, it was sent to the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority for an "in kind" contribution. Lawrence Jacobi, Jr., General Manager, has spiritedly provided the material in Chapter VII. Mr. Jacobi regrets that this present volume is not more thorough and should be more extensively researched. However, the intent of the editors is for a short booklet directed towards the general public. The Mexican government has reviewed the scientific data generated concerning the proposed site so close to their border, but excerpts of that report cannot be included at this time.

Archeological resources of the region are discussed in chapter VIII. This provides explanations of features in the area that are of interest to the general public. The inclusion of this topic is intended to emphasize the many things of interest which can be present in such a desert site. Nearby in some of the same rock units giant tortoise fossils were discovered several years ago and portions of mammoth skeletons have also been found.

Lynda Lynch (private citizen, advocate, artist and Hudspeth County native) wrote the Chapter X article entitled 30 Miles of Dust, Hudspeth County Nuclear Dump Moves but Goes Nowhere.

Finally, the geology and hydrology are the data, the 'facts', and in the present booklet these have been taken and summarized largely from recent scientific studies paid for by the Texas State Low Level Nuclear Waste Authority. The studies were carried out by the Bureau of Economic Geology of the State of Texas. These are short, objective, scientific documents, summarizing studies of specific questions or targets. Often it is difficult for the general public to understand the relevance of this information to scientific issues, and the present volume does not pretend to provide a complete geological understanding to the general public. The volume of scientific literature is large and not all of it could be referred to here. Results of some studies are summarized in Chapter XI.

This booklet is also designed to serve as a guidebook to the Fort Hancock area itself, although it is evident that site will not be utilized by the Texas Low-Level Nuclear Waste Authority for disposal purposes. The past-Governor of Texas, Ann Richards, overruled the Texas Low-Level Nuclear Waste Authority on this issue, and it was suggested that the site be east of Sierra Blanca, 50 mi east of the now discarded Fort Hancock site. An artistic rendition of this action is featured on the cover of this booklet. Study of the area is now deemed to be in vain, but the situation can be used as a the site location change. Chapter XI gives a brief guide to features in the Fort Hancock region. With respect to the desert , two different opinions are common: 1) it is a beautiful area and ecosystem, 2) it is ugly and dead. You must visit the area to decide for yourself, and to ponder more deeply the issues at hand. Field trips can be made to the area, and eventually to Sierra Blanca. Such trips are a rewarding way to face and better understand the issues.

The nuclear and nuclear waste communities as a whole must develop better ways of communicating with the general public. Governmental/political authorities at times dictate actions against the will of minority polarized opinions; however, often these minority opinions can be reasoned with by communication and education. The U.S. Department of Energy stated recently that it recognizes that certain social issues are important to radioactive waste management as well as technical issues, and, no social issue "commands as much attention and is as widely regarded and far reaching as the question of public trust and confidence". To this goal, the DOE initiated the first meeting on May 14, 1991, of the Advisory Board Task Force to Ensure Public Trust and Confidence. Texas has not yet been rewarded by such open-mindedness. Indeed, hopefully an extreme opinion was expressed by Texas State Senator Bill Sims: "I'll be dead by the time it leaks" -- and he will be buried far away.

Acknowledgments
The sponsors and publishers of this booklet, the El Paso Geological Society, Department of Geological Sciences, and the Energy Center, are thanked for their support of this public education effort. The Society is a not4or-profit organization of El Paso citizens and professionals interested in the geological sciences, and the Department and Center are a part of The University of Texas at El Paso.

The authors of the chapters of this booklet contributed their expertise and time to make this booklet possible. Geotimes granted permission for the reproduction of Chapter II. Pam Hart provided continuing office assistance, Sandra Ladewig kindly gave editorial assistance and word processing skills. Kathy Goodell proof read the final volume. All of these people are thanked for their efforts. 

 The fate of low-level radioactive waste disposal in the United States is an issue that is gaining controversy as states grapple with the federally mandated site-selection process. The current national search for disposal sites began in 1980, when Congress passed the "Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act." This bill required individual states or groups of states - compacts - to manage and dispose of their own low-level waste, and a deadline of 1986 was set for sites to begin accepting wastes. At the time the act was signed into law, commercial sites in Beatty, Nev., Barnwell, S.C., and Richland, Wash., accommodated all wastes.
 

COMPACT MEMBERSHIP
Compact	State
Northwest	Alaska, Hawaii, Washington*+, Oregon, Idaho, Utah, Montana
Southwest	California*, Arizona, North Dakota, South Dakota
Midwest	Michigan*, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Indiana, Ohio, Missouri
Central Interstate	Nebraska*, Kansas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana
Central Midwest	Illinois*, Kentucky
Appalachian	Pennsylvania*, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware
Northeast	Connecticut*, New Jersey*
Southeast	North Carolina*, South Carolina+, Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida
* Host State  + Active Site

By 1985 Congress realized that insufficient progress was being made to meet the upcoming deadline and passed the "Low-Level Waste Policy Amendments Act." This bill extended the final deadline for operating sites to Jan. 1, 1993, and set up intermediate milestones and penalties for states and compacts that procrastinated.

Site selection is proceeding more slowly than mandated by the 1980 and 1985 federal acts. There are many reasons for these delays, not the least of which are state and local politics and a lack of public confidence in the ability of scientists and engineers to design and build environmentally safe disposal sites for radioactive waste.

The site-selection process is generally similar from state to state. Host states are set for all compacts. Site-selection criteria are set in each host state and unaffiliated state. A state-wide exclusionary screening procedure leads to the identification of candidate areas and finally to the selection of several potential sites for detailed site characterization. If a site meets siting criteria, a license application is then submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or approved state agency. As of late 1990, progress toward the 1993 deadline is highly uneven among states and compacts. Arid Western host states are locating potentially suitable sites more. rapidly than states in the more humid climatic regime east of the Mississippi River: For example, in 1988 California joined Arizona, North Dakota, and South Dakota to form the Southwestern Compact, and the Ward Valley site in the Mojave Desert was designated as its proposed site. A license application has been submitted and the facility could begin operating in 1991. Favorable hydrogeological characteristics of the site include 6 in of annual precipitation and the 650- to 700-foot depth of the water table.

The Central Interstate Compact has made considerable progress toward construction of a facility in Nebraska. Three sites were characterized and the Bufte site in north-central Nebraska was selected. The license application is now in the review stage. The Bufte site has a buffer of 500 to 1,000 ft of Cretaceous shale between the waste and the area's main aquifer, the Dakota Sandstone. The water table is shallow, (15 ft) but the proposed facility design consists of above- ground vaults.

Texas, an unaffiliated state, has chosen a site 40 mi southeast of El Paso at the eastern edge of the Hueco bolson, a major basin-and-range graben. Annual rainfall at the site is nine inches, potential evaporation is 73 in, and the water table is 500 ft below land surface. Groundwater quality is poor in the Tertiary and Holocene alluvium underlying the site, and the site has no hydraulic connection with bolson sediments that serve as aquifers. Formal designation and

licensing have been postponed by a lawsuit filed by El Paso County. The estimated date for facility operation has been pushed back to 1996. The Northwest Compact is unique in that its states will be served after the 1992 deadline by the existing site at Richland, WA. The Rocky Mountain Compact is negotiating with the Northwest Compact for use of the Richland site after its current site at Beatty, NV, closes in 1992.

High water tables, more abundant rainfall, and higher population density have made site selection more difficult in the east. Public and political resistance to siting have been intense in Michigan, the host state for the Midwest Compact. In 1989, three candidate areas were chosen in Pleistocene glacial lake beds. Two of these were excluded quickly after identification of more wetlands than mapped originally. The final candidate area in southeast Michigan was subjected to more detailed scrutiny. This site is underlain by up to 150 ft of low-permeability lacustrine sediments over Devonian black shale. Despite these favorable characteristics, the water table is near land surface and flooding is common. The site was therefore excluded, and evaluation was initiated on the remaining 78 areas not ruled out by the statewide exclusionary screen. In 1990, two events further clouded the process. First, the Midwest Compact voted to deny funding for simultaneous evaluation of the 78 sites. Second, officials from the three current host states threatened to refuse access to Michigan waste unless siting criteria were made less stringent by the Michigan legislature. Michigan has challenged both of these actions.

In the Central Midwest Compact, two Illinois sites have progressed through site characterization. The Martinsville alternative site includes a thick sequence of glacial sediments containing multiple discontinuous sand and gravel beds. Three-dimensional ground-water modeling has been successful in simulating ground-water flow within the complex stratigraphy of the site. The ability to model and monitor site performance is a federally mandated requirement of site selection.

Closure of the Barnwell site in 1992 will require development of a new site for the Southeast Compact. Four favorable site areas have been identified in the host state of North Carolina. In April 1990, two of these were selected for site characterization. The anticipated opening of the site is delayed until Jan. 1, 1995.

Two compacts in the northeast have not yet named candidate areas or sites. The Appalachian Compact, with Pennsylvania as its host state, has finalized siting criteria, as have New Jersey and Connecticut, which form the Northeast Compact. The Northeast Compact is atypical in that both member states will be host states.

Several unaffiliated states in the northeast have not yet reached the site characterization stage. Site selection in Maine differs from other states in that volunteer candidate areas have been solicited from local governments and private industry. Evaluation of these areas will be simultaneous with areas identified by a systematic screening process. Five potential sites in south-central New York were identified in 1989. These sites are located in areas of fine-grained till overlying shale. On-site precharacterization studies scheduled for early 1990 were postponed due to citizen opposition. A new amendment to the state legislation changed the siting process in several ways, including a requirement for approval of a facility design before site selection.
 

Congress adopted the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Act in 1980 requiring the States either to enter into an interstate compact for the establishment of a common disposal site or to develop their own site. Either way, the Act required that the waste disposal facility be on line by 1993 (91 U.S. Stat. 3347,1980). In compliance with the federal law the Texas General Assembly adopted the Texas Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority Act in 1981 (67 Tx. Leg. R.S. 713, 1981).

Though the law did enable the Authority to contract with an "interstate agency," the provisions of the original Act reflected the clear intention of the Legislature that the disposal site should be in Texas. Not until 1991, after the Authority site selection process had been rebuffed by both the State Court and Legislature, did the law makers seriously consider the possibility of joining an interstate compact. Senate Bill 552 authorized the State to enter into such a compact under certain conditions, even to locate a common disposal site in Texas (72 Tx. Leg, R.S. 2095, 1 991).

However, no such interest was evident in the formative years of the Authority. The Authority, first established in 1982, is headed by a six member board including one physician, one lawyer, one health physicist, one geologist, and two representatives of the general public, appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The site selection process commenced in 1983 with a survey of the geology, hydrology, archeology, demography and land use of every county in the State. An environmental engineering consulting firm, Dames and Moore, was hired by the Authority to conduct the study. Two counties in South Texas, McMullen and Dimmit, emerged from that study with what were called the "best" sites. Strong local opposition, however, prompted that region's State Senator, Judith Zaffirini of Laredo, in the 1985 legislative session to propose changes in the site selection criteria which would have the effect of eliminating those two "best" sites from consideration. Zaffirini, a member of the Senate Natural Resources Committee, waited until Committee Chairman Tell Santiestaban of El Paso was away from the capitol to push her proposals through the committee where they had been pigeonholed by Santiestaban. The 1985 site selection amendments subsequently adopted, pointed the Authority away from McMullen and Dimmit Counties in South Texas to Hudspeth County in Far West Texas by: 1) prohibiting the location of a disposal site within 20 mi upstream or up-drainage from a water reservoir, 2) relieving the Authority of the obligation to select the "best site", and 3) giving preference to an "equally suitable" site on land owned by the State (619 Tx. Leg. R.S. 2479, 1985).

It was the state land preference in the 1985 amendments, along with repeal of the "best site" criteria, which shifted the focus of the Authority to far West Texas where most of those state lands are located. The 20 mi reservoir setback rule had the effect of eliminating the originally preferred South Texas sites, but it also applied with equal logic to the subsequently favored site at Fort Hancock in Hudspeth County (Plaintiffs' Closing Argument 1990, p. 19).

Legislative revision of the site selection criteria triggered the Authority to launch a new search, this time for a "suitable site" rather than the "best site." Interpreting the amendment to eliminate, for all practical purposes, all but state owned land, the new Dames and Moore study was restricted to land held in the permanent school or university funds, and Hudspeth County has more of such land that any other county in the State.

Fort Hancock, which lies along Interstate 10, 48 mi east of the El Paso city Limits, was not identified as one of the "relatively more suitable sites" in the original Dames and Moore siting study. A cursory and informal in-house search by the Authority staff in the Spring of 1985 identified five apparently suitable sites, all in Hudspeth County (Hussey 1986). The Fort Hancock site was one of those (Plaintiffs' Closing Argument, 1990, p. 12). According to the Plaintiffs in the 1990 case County of El Paso v. Texas Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority:

The Fort Hancock site was first identified in April, 1985; studied continuously by TLLRWDA beginning no later than July, 1985 to the present; first incorporated in a formal document by the TLLRWDA in October, 1985; chosen by the Board of directors as a potential disposal site in November 1986; and proposed by the board as the "most suitable site" in November, 1989 (Plaintiffs' Closing Argument, 1990, p. 3-4).

The Authority was required by the 1981 statute to select at least two potential sites by 1986. To meet the deadline, the Board in 1986 selected the Fort Hancock site in southern Hudspeth County as its clear choice, and a northern Hudspeth County site which previously had been rejected by the Board as geologically too complex. In effect, the Board Included the northern site as a "ringer" to meet the two site requirement, but leaving Fort Hancock as the only viable choice (Frownfelter, 1991b).

Former El Paso County Attorney Luther Jones was elected County Judge in November, 1986. When the Authority Board designated Fort Hancock as a "potential disposal site," Jones called upon newly elected County Attorney Joe Lucas to initiate legal proceedings against the Authority (Jones, 1991). Lucas selected as Special Assistant County Attorney and lead counsel in the subsequent lawsuits an attorney with substantial experience in environmental and nuclear regulatory law. Darcy Frownfelter had become familiar with the problem of low-level radioactive waste disposal while legal counsel to Idaho Governor John Evans' Office of Energy. Evans was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Power of the National Governor's Conference, the major concern of which was low-level radioactive waste disposal, and Frownfelter chaired the staff committee. In El Paso, specializing In water law, he was a logical choice to represent the plaintiffs and was retained early in 1987 (Frownfelter, 1991b).

On February 20, 1987 he asked 34' District Court Judge William Moody, sitting in Hudspeth County, for a declaratory judgment against the Authority's interpretation of the statute governing the disposal site selection process (Frownfelter, 1991a). Judge Moody immediately issued a temporary restraining order, and on March 2' a temporary injunction prohibiting the Authority from proceeding with site selection until he could hearths declaratory judgment request on its merits (Opinion, 1987, p. 1).

Specifically, the Authority was enjoined from:

1.Selecting the two potential sites in Hudspeth County pursuant to Section 3.07(a) [of the Texas Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority Act].

2.Selecting any site in the State pursuant to Section 3.06 and Section 3.07 which is not the "best site."

3.Selecting any site pursuant to Section 3.06 and 3.07 which is within 20 ml upstream or up-drainage of any reservoir project that has been constructed.

4.Preferring state owned lands and selecting sites pursuant to Section 3,06 and Section 3.07(a) (Opinion, 1987, P. 4).

Five months later the Texas Legislature, in special session, changed the site selection criteria to meet much of Moody's injunction (70 Tx. Leg. S.C.S. 87, 1987). According to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, to whom the Authority had appealed the District Court Decision:

• The "best site" location criteria urged by appellee has been changed to require the Authority to select [a] suitable site....

• The "State Land Preference" requirement which was conditioned on funds being specifically appropriated under Section 3.07A(a) has now been amended abolishing the prerequisite funding ... (Opinion, 1987, p. 5).

By September of 1987 Hudspeth County had joined El Paso County in the legal challenge to the Authority, along with Hudspeth County Conservation and Reclamation District No. 1, Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation and Declamation District No. I and a number of Hudspeth County ranchers. El Paso's standing In the case was based upon the fact that the Fort Hancock site lay less that 15 mi from El Paso County, that it lay along the natural growth corridor of the El Paso urban area, and that it sits above ground water reserves needed by the El Paso metropolitan area (Lucas, 1991). The addition of plaintiffs from Hudspeth County greatly strengthened the standing of Plaintiffs, though El Paso County still bore the legal expenses.

Meanwhile, the El Paso County Attorney's Office was gearing up to battle the Authority on a wide range of site selection standards. Geologist Mark Turnbough, who had discussed the Fort Hancock site with candidate Luther Jones prior to the 1986 election, was selected by Jones to put together a task force of scientists and engineers to conduct an independent investigation of the Fort Hancock site (Turnbough, 1991). Experts in geology, geomorphology, hydrology, archeology, demography, land use and wildlife management were employed to study, and if findings warranted, challenge the findings of the Authority in regard to site selection criteria.

Selected in May of 1988 to coordinate the efforts of experts in many scientific and engineering specializations and make comprehensive independent evaluation of the Fort Hancock site on behalf of Plaintiffs was the Phoenix firm Sergent, Hauskins and Beckwith, consulting geotechnical engineers usually representing the applicant in licensing proceedings (Turnbough, 1991).

Gayle Garner was named First Assistant County Attorney in January, 1988, then joined Frownfelter in preparing the case against the Authority in August, 1989. An amended petition was filed in Judge Moody's Court in May, 1990, following a two year moratorium in which scientific investigations were conducted by both sides (Frownfelter, 1991b). Trial was held September 6-22, 1990. Plaintiffs challenged the Authority's choice of the Fort Hancock site on grounds that it violated the site selection standards adopted by the Board:

1.The site is located in what is called an area of complex geology: it is the only area in Texas with any earthquake potential, scarcely 95 mi from the epicenter of the Valentine earthquake of 1931.

2.The site lies on a 100 year flood plain, directly up-drainage and 10 mi away from that major international waterway, the Rio Grande River. Further, it lies in a recharge zone for the Hueco Bolson which is the major source of water for the El Paso/Juarez metropolitan area.

3.The site sits astride a natural growth corridor for the El Paso metropolitan area.

4.It lies within 3 mi of the Alamo Canyon/Wilkey Ranch National Register Archeological District and several other rock art preserves which may one day be listed in the National Register.

5.The Fort Hancock site lies wholly within or adjacent to the 3 mi protective zone of a wildlife management area operated by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department under a lease agreement with the General Land Office.

6.The site contains one wetland designated by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. Another such wetland is located just north of the Authority's choice for low-level radioactive waste disposal (Plaintiffs' Closing Argument, 1990).

Defendants relied primarily upon procedural grounds to defend their position:

1.El Paso County lacked standing to sue since it has no extraterritorial jurisdiction.

2.The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the State from being sued without its consent, except on federal constitutional questions, and the one constitutional question raised by Plaintiffs, the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects private but not corporate persons.

3.The District Court lacked jurisdiction since the Legislature provided for judicial review only at the conclusion of the licensing process.

4.It was the Legislature's intent, in setting standards for site selection, that the Authority apply the standards flexibly, in accordance with its professional judgment; in other words, that the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of administering a legislative act, is best qualified to interpret that act.

5.In any case, the Plaintiffs were premature in their suit since the Authority had made no final choice of the disposal site and therefore none of the Plaintiffs had suffered any injury from the site selection process (Defendants' Final argument, 1990).

Defendants made no real effort to rebut the factual allegations of the Plaintiffs except to minimize their significance or the ability of Plaintiffs to interpret the facts. Their entire case seemed to be based upon the assumption that the Disposal Authority Act of 1981 had empowered the Board and its staff as the sole authority on low-level radioactive waste disposal and that any challenge to that authority was not only contrary to legislative intent but impertinent as well.

Judge Moody found for the Plaintiffs on January 21, 1991 and issued a permanent injunction against selection of the Fort Hancock site by the Authority (Final Judgment 1991). Rather than moving immediately to appeal the District Court decision, the Authority followed the strategy which had worked so well in 1987. State Representative Dan Shelly of Houston, home of the Texas Light and Power Company, which generates most of the State's low-level radioactive waste, introduced legislation which would have had the effect of nullifying Judge Moody's decision. House Bill 2665, referred to the House Environmental Affairs Committee, directed the Authority to select the Fort Hancock site "notwithstanding any other law . . ." and to make application to all state and federal agencies from which licenses must be obtained. The Texas Department of Health was given 30 days from receipt of the application from the Authority to act on the application. The bill further provided that any future judgment, injunction, declaration or writ issued against the Authority by District Court would be suspended upon the filing of an appeal to any higher court, and only the Texas Supreme Court would have the authority to reinstate the judgment pending appeal. Finally the bill provided that, in the future, action could be brought against the Authority only in Travis County (the State capitol) District Court (Shelly, 1991).

If adopted and upheld by the State Supreme Court, the Shelly bill would have nullified Judge Moody's order because the injunction was directed against the Authority's site selection criteria and process which would have been superceded and overriden by the Legislature's site declaration(Garner,1991b). According to First Assistant County Attorney Gayle Garner, had H.B. 2665 been adopted in its original form, El Paso's only recourse would have been:

• to file a new lawsuit charging the Legislature with intruding upon the authority of the Court and thereby violating the Separation of Powers doctrine of the State Constitution,
• in an administrative hearing, to contest the Authority's subsequent license application to the State Bureau of Radiation Control, where the sole issue would be the suitability of the Fort Hancock site without reference to any other site, or
• to challenge the probable conclusion of the Bureau of Radiation Control back in State Court (Garner, 1991, p. 3.)

The committee, however, failed to honor the agreement. While Shelly and Garner were back home consulting with their respective principals, the committee met and voted the Shelly bill out with a recommendation for approval by the full House. Shelly urged Garner to continue the search for a compromise, an urging seconded by El Paso Senator Peggy Reason, who felt that the Senate leadership would support such a compromise.

Attorneys Garner and Frownfelter, along with geologist Turnbough, after consultation with El Paso and Hudspeth County Commissioners Court and the Authority staff, identified a 400 mi' area at the extreme northeastern edge of Hudspeth County within which could be found the requisite geologic, hydrologic and archeologic characteristics. Shelly objected to the lack of a fail back provision in the El Paso substitute, to reinstate the Fort Hancock site if the compromise proved unsuitable, and he ultimately opposed the compromise on the House floor (Garner, 1991b, p. 4-5).

Shelly offered his original bill to the full House membership, while El Paso representatives Pat Haggerty and Nancy McDonald introduced amendments to substitute the Fort Hancock site with the compromise site from northeast Hudspeth County. Haggerty led the floor fight for adoption of the amendments. His argument focused upon two points: (1) that the Legislature would be violating the Separation of Powers doctrine of the Texas Constitution if it adopted the original Shelly bill because of the latter's apparent intrusion upon the authority of the court system, and (2) that the Authority itself had concluded early in the process that Fort Hancock was not a good site and it made little sense to reverse that original conclusion, particularly when the compromise offered what seemed to be a far superior site (Haggerty, 1991).

Haggerty's argument was bolstered behind the scenes by the El Paso Interreligious Sponsoring Organization (EPISO), led by Sister Maribeth Larkin, in its alliance with other Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in Texas. The alliance had opposed selection of the South Texas sites in 1985 when Larkin was associated with the Valley Interfaith CBO in Westlaco, Texas, because the Authority seemed to be "dumping" on Mexican American communities. Similar opposition to the Fort Hancock site was placed near the top of the alliance's 1991 legislative agenda (Larkin, 1991). As a result the Governor and Lt. Governor, as well as members of the Legislature, were heavily lobbied.

Governor Ann Richards who received strong support from the CBO alliance in the 1990 elections, went so far as to suggest to the Authority that it seek an alternative site (Richards, 1991), a suggestion the Authority Board rejected (Resolution, 1991). However much Governor Richards may have supported the CBO alliance in its opposition to the Fort Hancock site, her attraction to the Houston and Dallas power companies was apparently stronger, for she resisted all attempts to extract a veto pledge from her (Garner, 1991c).

The House vote of 81-41 in favor of the El Paso amendments came as something of a surprise considering the intense floor fight waged by Shelly and the Chairman of the Environmental Affairs Committee, Robert Saunders of La Grange, for the original H,B. 2665. The victory can be attributed to the lobbying efforts of Garner and CBOs behind the scenes, the El Paso House delegation working the floor, and the skillful argument of Haggerty (Garner, 1991c).

The amended bill cleared the House on May 22, five days before the end of the legislative sessions. With time running out, the Authority Board and lobbyists for the Houston and Dallas power companies agreed to support the House-passed version in the Senate where, from her position on the Natural Resources Committee, Senator Rosson had already lined up the support of Lt. Governor Bob Bullock and the ranking member of the Senate, Chet Brooks of Pasadena (Garner, 1991b, p. 5-6). The measure was placed on the Senate "fast track" and emerged three days later with two necessary but noncontroversial procedural amendments which nevertheless required routine House confirmation. Governor Richards signed the bill into law on June 16, 1991, presumably ending the threat to Fort Hancock (72 Tx. Leg. R.S. 2579, 1991).

Conclusion
The facts in the case of the Texas Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal site selection process give rise to several critical questions about the way in which public policy is adopted and administered in Texas:

• Is the State Legislature and bureaucracy competent to deal with public policy questions involving scientific findings?
• Is the Legislature so fragmented that it is incapable of identifying and representing the general public interest?; or
• Does special interest politics so inure legislators to payoffs from special interests that they have lost the will to stand for the common good?

The recurring error in the Texas Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority's site selection process was the assumption of politics as usual, where special interests choose up sides and the loser gets the dump site as booby prize. The Legislature played lip service to scientific integrity by requiring that the Authority be dominated by scientists and that their siting studies follow clearly defined scientific standards. However, when those scientists and their standards pointed to a site unacceptable to certain special interests, the Legislature rewrote the standards as necessary to guarantee that the political acceptability of the site would override scientific acceptability (Jones, 1991). Then, rather than insisting upon a site which would meet the scientific criteria, the scientists and engineers of the Authority followed the course of political expediency. It is unfortunate, but not unexpected, that scientists turned bureaucrats behave more like bureaucrats than scientists. The evidence is convincing that, in their minds, members of the Authority staff settled on Hudspeth County because of its political expediency long before there were any studies of its suitability; indeed, at a time when the only evidence, the original Dames and Moore survey, suggested its unsuitability (Plaintiffs' Closing Argument, 1990).

The subordination of general public interest to special interest in this or any other contemporary public policy issue can be traced to the lack of any kind of institution in Texas government which is capable of identifying and representing that general interest. The same technology which produces radioactive waste has also turned Texas into a highly diverse society. Representatives elected in both the House and the Senate must certainly defend the interests of their particular locale or region against the demands of other areas, but Senate and House leadership could promote the common interest were party organization, to which such leadership historically has been obligated, alive and well. However, in Texas, as across the country, the grass roots party structure is in shambles, forcing candidates who have won a place on the party ballot to turn to big money special Interests to fund increasingly expensive election campaigns. Governors, elected by a statewide constituency, are in a better position to identify and represent the general interest, but they too must depend upon special interests to fund statewide media campaigns and find themselves obligated to special rather than general interests in the policy making process.

In the Texas search for a disposal site, Governor Ann Richards did ultimately come down on the side of the general public interest, but she did so to fulfill an obligation to one special interest, the CBO alliance, and her commitment to that interest was limited by her obligation to another special interest, the Houston and Dallas power companies. Senator Rosson lays the blame for the whole site selection debacle upon (1) the "arrogance which permeates the utility industry," and (2) upon the federal government's failure to impose site selection standards and exercise oversight of the siting process (Rosson, 1991). Representative Haggerty blames the legislative process: Legislative sessions are too short to conduct the State's law making business, lot alone exercise the proper oversight of such agencies as the Texas Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority (Haggerty, 1991).

Texas was saved from legislative, bureaucratic and special interest irresponsibility by the political leadership of County Judge Luther Jones, County Attorneys Joe Lucas and Gayle Garner, State Representative Pat Haggerty and State Senator Peggy Rosson, as they represented the special interests of Far West Texas, and by the willingness of the El Paso public to commit 2.75 million dollars to the mobilization of the massive scientific and legal expertise necessary to shock the Court and the General Assembly into recognition of the problem. It was, after all, the expert scientific analysis of the Fort Hancock site and expert legal presentation of scientific findings which convinced the Court and the Legislature of the Authority's error. What is most sobering about the case is the demonstration that science must compete with special interests on the latter's terms if it wishes to influence public policy on such critical environmental issues as ozone depletion, global warming and radioactive waste disposal. One wonders if the public is ready to finance science PACs so as to "buy" the support of legislators. The alternative Is serious reform of legislator compensation and elections, including campaign finance, so as to eliminate the extraordinary influence of special interests. One wonders if the public is ready to reform the system.

References
Bennett, W. Lance, 1991, The Governing Crisis: Media, Money and Marketing in American Elections: St. Martins Press, New York, 256 p.

'Defendants' Final Argument, 1990, El Paso County v. Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority, 34th District Court of Texas, No. 2588-34 Nov. 19.

Final Judgment, 1991, El Paso County v. TLLRWDA, 34th District Court of Texas, No. 2588-34, April 25.

Frownfelter, Darcy, 1991a, Interview, July 11.
Frownfelter, Darcy, 1991b, Interview, September 26.

Garner, Gayle, 1991a, Interview, July 16.
Garner, Gayle,1991b, Memorandum to the Author, October. 15.
Garner, Gayle, 1991c, Interview, October 18.

Haggerty, Pat, 1991, Interview, September 10.

Hussy, James, 1985, Memorandum to Sal and Ruben, July 20.

Jones, Luther, 1991, Interview, August 2.

Larkin, Maribeth, 1991, Interview, July 19.

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, U.S. Stat. 3347.

Lucas, Joe, 1991, Interview, July 26.

"Opinion of the Court',1987, Texas Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority. EI Paso County, 740 S.W.2d 7 (Tx. App. -- El Paso 1987).

"Plaintiffs' Closing Argument", 1990, El Paso County v. TLLRWDA, 34th District Court, No. 2588-34, Nov. 19.

"Resolution", 1991, Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority Board of Directors, April 2.

Richards, Ann, 1991, Letter to Lawrence R. Jacobi, Jr., March 1 5,

Rosson, Peggy, 1991, Interview, September 13.

Shelley, Dan, 1991, House Bill 2665, Texas General Assembly, March 8.

Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority Act of 1981. 67 Tx. Leg. Regular Session 713.

Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority Act of 1981, 1985 Amendments. 69 Tx. Leg. Regular Session 2479.

Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority Act of 1981, 1987 Amendments. 70 Tx. Leg. Second Called Session 87.

Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority Act of 1981, 1991 Amendments. 72 Tx. Leg. Regular Session 2095, 2529.

Turnbough, Mark 1991, Interview, October 2.

Introduction
Locating a site for a significant project or facility results in either a conjunction or collision of political and technical needs. Fear, greed, political agendas, real and perceived effects, regulations, law, and technical criteria can provide a volatile mix, as can be observed in any number of projects, including radioactive waste disposal, where a site must be found. Technical aspects of locating a site commonly are poorly presented and understood, contributing to the volatility.

I will discuss my experience and understanding of the process of locating and studying a site based on three radioactive waste disposal projects: 1) the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project located east of Carlsbad, NM; 2) the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority (TLLRWDA) attempt to locate a site in Hudspeth County, TX; and 3) the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) In Nevada.

The WIPP is intended as a disposal site for transuranic waste which has been produced through the nation's nuclear weapons programs. Most of the waste is also low level and can be handled without elaborate protection. I began work on the WIPP in 1975, before the present site was selected. As an employee, and later as a division supervisor, at Sandia National Laboratories, I was responsible for much of the early investigation of the present site. I continue to work on the geology of the site as a consultant.

The TLLRWDA is responsible for locating and characterizing a site, within Texas, for the disposal of low level radioactive waste generated by various sources, such as hospitals and commercial nuclear reactors. The Rio Grande Council of Governments (then West Texas COG) sponsored a committee or panel of volunteer members to examine the site selection process and studies of the specific site$ in west Texas. I served on this committee and provided a review of the process and sites, as they were known at that time.

The YMP is a project for the disposal of high level commercial radioactive waste, such as spent fuel rods from commercial power-producing reactors. The site under investigation is in southern Nevada, at the southwest corner of the Nevada Test Site, For more than a year and a half, I have been chairman of an international external review panel examining reports in which it is claimed that the site is unsuitable because of the potential for groundwater to rise hundreds of feet above its present level in response to earthquakes.

The processes by which these sites were selected differ considerably overall but have some common elements.

A Site Selection Process
There are several steps to be taken to try to find a suitable site for a project or facility.

In the first place, we must identify the need for the project: locate a place to build a high-security prison or locate a site to isolate radioactive waste. Such needs are readily identified; there may be some conflict over the need (e.g., are high-security prisons the proper solution to the problem of having desperados among us?), but these are not the conflicts which usually arouse you, me, and our neighbors to action over a specific location.

The next step usually is to identify some initial factors which can be used to narrow the search from the world in general to a reasonably-sized piece of ground. Such factors usually mix a variety of needs ranging from technical to political and may not be totally defensible. When we were trying to find a new site for the WIPP in 1976 (after rejecting an initial site after 3 boreholes were drilled), all areas within 2 mi of deeper boreholes were eliminated initially due to unresolved concern about the effects of dissolution of salt around boreholes (Griswold, 1977; Powers et al., 1978). A radius of 1 mi was later believed to be adequate based on further studies.

These initial factors serve as screening devices: we eliminate areas from consideration on the basis of a variety of features including common sense geological factors and political factors. We include areas which have the positive or minimum characteristics necessary for the facility or site. So the factors may be either inclusionary or exclusionary, but they are designed to reduce the area to be further examined to a manageable size.

A common exclusionary factor common for sites or facilities involving some possible hazards is to locate the site away from population centers. If something goes awry at a facility, human exposure to hazards should be less at a remote site. Such a criterion for the TLLRWDA eliminated much of the eastern part of the state early in the process. A more cynical view is that avoiding areas of high population density is a political necessity; areas like west Texas have fewer votes within the Texas legislature to oppose a site or affect the conditions placed by the legislature on the site selection. In this case, both a common sense technical screening parameter and political reality produce the same effect. People opposing a site location can perceive the technical screening parameter as simply a device to mask political motives.

When a possible site for the WIPP was searched for during the early 1970's, a positive criterion was that thick salt beds had to be available. Much of the U.S. does not have salt beds under the surface. Areas under parts of Michigan, Now York, the Gulf Coast, west Texas and New Mexico, parts of eastern Kansas and Oklahoma, western North Dakota, and eastern Utah have significant salt beds. Kansas and some other areas were eliminated in general by factors such as poor records of drilling, high population, and land use.

Further examples of these screening criteria might include:
 

Initial site characterization of one or two locations will usually reveal more direct evidence that the basic site characteristics are as believed from the evidence available before direct investigation. These efforts might include one or two deeper drill holes, some shallower hydrologic investigations, and a mix of geophysical studies appropriate to show some of the basic site characteristics.

If the initial site investigations confirm the basic characteristics which were attractive during the screening process, the next step of detailed site characterization can begin. Several objectives are important during this phase:

• provide details of the hydrologic system at and around the site,
• determine geologic system in detail,
• investigate the geologic stability of the site,
• analyze the mineral/petroleum resources of the site,
• develop data which may be used for performance assessment,
• select the specific horizon or location for disposal site, and
• examine features which may be "fatal flaw"

The detailed site investigation which follows site selection should be the further basis for finally accepting a site or rejecting it, even after the site may have been examined for years. From a technical viewpoint, this is quite reasonable, though politics[ and economic factors make it important to try to determine as quickly as possible if a site is acceptable or not for the purpose intended.

Common Points in Opposing Sites
There are several common arguments or points which I have seen frequently offered as proposed "killers" for sites. Among these points, I would like to discuss three: 1) the "best site" case, 2) the "fatal flaw," and 3) guaranteeing a site is safe. Each has a certain appeal and is used in various forms during a site investigation.

Many believe or have stated that for purposes of radioactive waste disposal, the "best" site must be found. The point to screening criteria and activity is to avoid the expense and time of studying all of the U.S. or Texas, as the case might be, to find a suitable site. It is also totally impractical to find the "best site." It sounds highly principled to demand that the "best" site only is acceptable. There is, in principal, only one "best' site in the world for low level radioactive waste disposal. The "best" site might even be in Texas, but the money and time to find the "best' site will never be available. In fact, a site which effectively isolates the waste for the required period of time is just as good as the "best" site, and it is all that is necessary from a technical standpoint. The initial or screening criteria practically help us to focus on smaller areas which may be suitable for the needs of the project or facility. It does not sound nearly as good to have an "adequate" site as having the "best' site. In fact, the "best" site will never be demonstrated, and forcing the siting process to work toward the "best" site is effective as a filibuster. It will only delay solution of the underlying problem.

A "fatal flaw"' is usually conceived as some feature that is so significant that it, by itself, is sufficient cause to reject a site regardless of other conditions at the site. Of course the perception of what constitutes a "fatal flaw" is quite variable. An initial site for the WIPP was rejected after a third drill hole at the site revealed the evaporate beds were highly deformed and yielded pressurized brine and gas. The deformation alone was sufficient to reject the site, as mining for a repository would become much more unpredictable and expensive in these beds. The deformed beds were sufficient to reject the site because of conditions desired for mining, though by themselves the deformed beds might well have provided sufficient isolation. The pressurized brine and gas, however, at depths being considered for disposal would have raised further questions about isolation.

In the local fight against the proposed Fort Hancock site for disposal of low level radioactive waste, El Paso county officials believed "fatal flaws" included the earthquake hazard. There are two Interesting aspects to this "fatal flaw" argument. The first is that the disposal site and facility would not include any active systems, such as exist within a reactor or an industrial plant. It is quite likely that engineering design can compensate for the expectable earthquake hazard for this site. While ft is clear there are many areas of Texas with lower earthquake hazards, the earthquake hazard at the Fort Hancock site is not likely a "fatal flaw" which could not be overcome. Even more interesting is the fact that El Paso itself is located in an area with earthquake hazard like that at Fort Hancock. Yet there are no special provisions in the building code for earthquake hazards, and a new county courthouse was designed and built without special provision for earthquake hazard. This was done during the same period the county was vigorously opposing the Fort Hancock site where relatively few people now live or would have been occupied in running the disposal facility. What this illustrates is that "fatal flaws" most often do exist in the eye of the beholder.

I have frequently heard stated the question of whether we (that is, the investigators of a site) can guarantee the safety of the site for the future. An absolute assurance of safety is desired - that there is no possibility of failure. Death and taxes may be certain, but little else is. Most people want to be reassured that there is no risk associated with a site for radioactive or hazardous waste disposal, but would also not believe (and rightly so) any such assurances. Life is a risk, and it is not possible to eliminate risk. We accept certain risks every day associated with our homes, work, and recreation. The public perceives risk in complicated ways which have been discussed and researched over the years. There is no wish, however, to assume an additional risk over which we have no control, even though it might be miniscule. Thus there will continue to be a demand for guarantees of no risk associated with facilities such as radioactive waste disposal site.

Some Concluding Comments
The process of selecting a site and evaluating it, especially for radioactive waste disposal, is lengthy and complex. The site selection process should simply be a ay to find one or more likely candidate sites which can be intensively investigated to determine their final suitability to the required task.

Because the geologic and hydrologic systems interact in complex ways, sites are evaluated on their overall ability to isolate waste. This evaluation is commonly called performance assessment (PA), and it depends on complex modeling of natural processes. While evaluating the significance of processes which may contribute to isolation, some information and processes are found to little affect isolation while others are of greater import. PA can be incorporated with site characterization to help direct resources (intellectual and monetary) toward important problems, with less emphasis on secondary issues. This approach differs from focusing on the single "fatal flaw" by recognizing that the performance of the overall system is important and that one part of the system may compensate for another part (which might be considered a "fatal flaw" by itself).

While PA is a desirable approach, it may be very difficult for many to understand or evaluate the underlying principles, statistical methods, or information used in the analysis. Personal guarantees, "best" sites, and "fatal flaws" are more appealing because the issue commonly Is simply and conclusively stated. Only the "fatal flaw" has some validity, but is often based on widely differing perceptions of what constitutes a "fatal flaw." PA is more defensible as a technical approach, but it will not be appealing to the general public desiring an easily understood answer. It may be reassuring to note that PA will require that the question of suitability of a site will remain open much longer; a "fatal flaw" found during PA will be more subtle and may result from the combination offactors or effects not intuitively understood during early stages.

References Cited
Griswold, G.B, 1977, Site selection and evaluation studies of the Waste Isolation Pilot plant (WIPP), Los Modafios, Eddy County, NM, SAND77-0946. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

Powers, D.W., S.J. Lambert, S.E. Shaffer, L.R. Hill, and W.D. Weart (eds.), 1978, Geological characterization report, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, southeastern New Mexico, SAND78-1596. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

Prologue: "How Did We Get up Here on Stage?"
We are in the midst of a communication crisis of which we are only dimly aware. Science and technology have progressed to a level of complexity beyond the grasp of even an educated public. This public maintains a love/hate relationship with science and technology: an unrelenting belief in its ability to solve complex environmental problems that derive mainly from scientific and technological progress coupled with population density, while struggling to read the programming instructions for their VCR or while gazing absently at the cramped and mysterious contents under the hood of a late model vehicle that won't run. Media personnel, pressured by ratings, advertising budgets, the competition, and dwindling audiences, strive to bring us the latest news in short, comprehensible, and exciting segments. Meanwhile, politicians and policymakers are also trying to understand science. Legislation takes place beneath piles of technical reports, between public outcries and lobbyist whispers, late at night as voting deadlines approach, dozing through expert testimony, worrying about upcoming elections and jockeying for positions of even more power.

These four groups (scientists, citizens, journalists, politicians) are the social actors in an unfolding tragedy. Starring roles are played by science and citizenry, while the media and politicians are cast in supporting roles. The actors speak to each other, but they don't seem to understand what the other is saying. They view each other as adversaries, even as their own survival depends on the actions of their follow actors a dysfunctional family. And the actors are also schizophrenic; they argue with themselves and play more than one role. The scientist sits at his desk composing a letter to the editor. Joe Q. decides to run for office. The reporter decides to go back to school and study engineering so she can make more money. How may we understand what is happening in this play? Is it 'Waiting for Godot" or "No Exit", the "Myth of Sisyphus" or "Six Characters in Search of an Author"?

Setting: Hudspeth County, Viewed through the Eyes of Texas
The case of a low-level radioactive dump site in Hudspeth County, Texas, offers an example of a setting in which we can explore the motives and behaviors of the social actors cast in this drama.

Radioactive waste is being produced in Texas and every other state, but it is not being produced in Hudspeth County. The principal sources of radioactive waste are military and medical research, industrial operations, and nuclear power plants. Low-level wastes are defined as those having

... a half-life of 35 years or less or fewer than 10 nanocuries per gram of transuranics, and may include radioactive material not excluded by this subdivision with a half-life of more than 35 years if special criteria for disposal of that waste are established by the department [Texas Department of Health] (Vernons, 1991:1199).

If the terms nanocuries, transuranics, or half-life are not explained in one of the other papers in this collection, complain to the editors. At the present time, it is inconceivable that our society will stop creating radioactive waste materials; they are the by-product of progress.

In 1980, the U.S. Congress mandated that states, or groups of states, plan for and implement by 1986, a way of disposing of low-level waste they create. At that time three commercial sites in Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington were receiving all the country's low-level waste. (Kehew, 1991). In 1985, the deadline for state or compact (groups of states) sites to be operational was extended to 1993, primarily because the site selection process proved to be so controversial. However, several states have joined together to form compacts, and have made significant progress toward completion of waste facilities. Texas has remained unaffiliated, but is considering forming a compact with Maine, roughly 2500 mi away, and the site of the Yankee Maine Power Plant, scheduled to be decommissioned in the near future, though there may be reason to believe the older plants will not be decommissioned as scheduled (Associated Press, 1991).

Originally, the Texas waste site was to have been south of San Antonio on privately owned land, but a law was passed mandating the site be located on state-owned land which eliminated virtually all sites in central, south, and east Texas (Associated Press, 1991; Scharrer, 1991). As Hudspeth County became the focus of the search for a site, a site near Dell City and a site near Fort Hancock were identified. Opposition to the site from Dell City residents led to the initial choice of Fort Hancock, 37 mi from El Paso. However, a lawsuit filed by El Paso and Hudspeth counties, and a ruling by the governor against the Texas Low-Level Nuclear Authority have mandated a site further away from El Paso. Currently, site selection efforts are concentrated back on private land in the Sierra Blanca area, approximately 90 mi from El Paso.

The Actors: "It's's in My Backyard, It's Not Politically Correct
Scientific information aside, politicians in Austin are unlikely to choose a site near a dense, vocal electorate, even if this is where most of the waste will be generated. Why? Politics are driven by "elite" and "public" opinions. These opinions have consistently taken the "not in my backyard" approach to problem solving. What could have been more political than to look for a site in a remote place, thereby ensuring the safety and relief of citizens and elites in "real" Texas cities. Even more political was the choice of Hudspeth County, inhabited by a few farmers and ranchers and by Spanish-speaking immigrants from Mexico who would be less likely to have access to power brokers in Austin or elsewhere, who might not even be citizens or registered voters, and who might be unaware of the issues or the process or who might rather have jobs regardless of risk.

However, the decision to locate a waste facility in Hudspeth County must not appear to be motivated by lack of concern for any group, even our Mexican neighbors to the South, 11 mi from the Fort Hancock site. It must appear that the decision to locate the site on public land in Hudspeth County was reached in a most impartial and scientific way (Gamboa, 1990). Now the scientists are called in to testify. But what scientific information is relevant? Do we care about geological stability of the site, rainfall and flood probabilities, the nearness (the "oh so" nearness) of the Rio Grande, potential for contamination of underground aquifers, the hazards of transporting materials from east Texas (or Maine!), the possible loss of knowledge and artifacts from earlier cultures indigenous to the region, the safety of the containers in which the waste will be stored, or the potential health effects of some kind of "accident", or some other piece of information we haven't even considered? Not one scientist understands all these issues, and reputable scientists may even disagree on just one issue.

Experts are able to support any side in most political contests with testimony before executive or legislative committees, sometimes by drawing on different sets of facts, but much more commonly by giving different cognitive and evaluative interpretations to available facts (Etzioni, 1968:174)

So, perhaps scientific information is not all science, but a mixture of fact and values. And sometimes we may need value consensus more than we need fact consensus. Thomas Kuhn provides an excellent description of the process of change in scientific values in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions:

In some senses, societal actors use knowledge in much the same way as persons: Their internal structures often bias their views of the world and of their changing places in it, and they misunderstand each other and act in "unrealistid' ways - what most societal actors use as knowledge, we suggest, includes a mixture of facts and common sense, science and folklore, empirical observations, insights, and evaluations (Etzioni, 1968, p.136-137).

And, don't forget politics.

The Dialogue: "It's Not My Fault -- It's Yours. I Can't Understand You Anyway".  The public wants certainty, but the language of science is probability. Politicians want re-election and the media wants a story that is exciting and fits into the allotted time or space. How do these motives translate into language?

Let's analyze a message from two scientists representing very prestigious universities and published in Science, possibly the most prestigious general scientific journal. What is their message to the other social actors In our drama?

Part of the problem is that we rely on a mix of individual, corporate, and government decision to respond to risk. Our traditional coordinating mechanisms -- markets and government action -- are crippled by inadequate information, costly decision making processes and the need to accomodate citizen's misperceptions, sometimes arising from imbalances in media attention (p. 559).

This is a message that at first glance, seems true. Yes, these things do happen. But the real message is one of blame, pointing a finger at the other social actors for muddled thoughts and acts: policy makers, the public, and finally the media. How could any of these groups have the answers; they are not scientists? The authors continue, in an objective, reassuring, and patriarchal fashion to clarity for us, the ideal "scientific" way to assess risk. We had better listen:

For one-time-only decisions, from the standpoint of Bayesian decision making, the mean assessment of the probability of each outcome is all that matters, for that gives the likelihood with which the outcome will be received. For example, suppose that with option I there is a 10% chance that a 0.01 risk is imposed and a 90% chance that no risk is imposed; with option 11, there is a 1 00% chance of a 0.002 risk. Option I should be preferred, since its mean risk (0.1 x 0.01 + 0.9 x 0 = 0.001) is lower than for option 11 (p. 562).

Fine, if we understand Bayesian decision making, if we can specify our alternative risks so precisely, and it we are willing to let these two arrogant scientists make our tough decisions.

How do politicians talk? The following is a quote from Governor Ann Richards, concerning the recent (June, 1991) appointment of El Paso lawyer, Carmen Rodríguez, to the board of directors of the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority. Prior to this appointment, no one from the El Paso region sat on the board.

I am pleased to appoint her to this board and am confident that El Pasoans will now have an increased role In the decision-making process. .... It was important to me that El Paso have a voice on the Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority Board. Carmen Rodríguez's legal background and experience will give El Pasoans that voice (Kidd, 1991).

If it was important that El Paso have a voice, why weren't they given one earlier.? The major decisions have already been made. El Pasoans should know that the governor is thinking of them and expecting them to remember this when election time rolls around. It also might be wise to consider whether the appointment of a young Hispanic female is a true gesture of inclusion in the decision making process, or whether the other board members will have the "ears' to hear this new voice.

Citizens' comments reveal distrust of both scientists and politicians, and a feeling of rage over their powerlessness in the process.

No matter how new the technology is that is going to be used in the dump, I think if there were any kind of guarantee they wouldn't be putting it out here. They would put it in the middle of Houston. They could put it in Ann Richards' backyard (Ella Kemp, quoted in an Associated Press article in the El Paso Times).

The "they" Ella Kemp angrily refers to are the scientists, engineers, and politicians. The following, citizen quote probably won't elicit much sympathy from either scientists or politicians.

We believe the majority of people in Hudspeth County are against the siting of this dump here, but many feel powerless on [sic] what can be done about it. Farmers and ranchers feel strongly opposed to this dump as they are very close to the land. They derive their livelihood from the land and cannot easily pick up and move (Bill Addington, quoted in an Associated Press article in the El Paso Times).

The media voice is garbled; key phrases are missing. We finish with more questions than answers. For example, an Associated Press article of September 17, 1991, mentions the political maneuvering that mandated the disposal site be situated on state-owned land. Five sentences later we are informed:

The Authority is [currently] studying a section located in the mandated area, on the Faskin Ranch owned by Statewide Capital, a Houston-based land management company.

Unless "statewide" qualifies as "state-owned", something important has changed or some sleight-of-hand has occurred. We are not informed. Was the story written this way, or did some zealous editor cut the critical link? ff so, was it in the interest of space or politics?

Each actor ridicules the others while mortified of ridicule directed at him. The public is ridiculed for not understanding scientific principles, for calling political attention to personal and familial safety concerns. Knowing he is not well-educated, he is often paralyzed. The media is almost universally scorned by scientists who are peeved by the suggestion that their life's work can be summarized in a paragraph or a short interview, especially by a person not similarly trained, and are seized with the fear that the reporter will make them appear ridiculous in the eyes of the public, or heaven forbid, their colleagues. Stepping out from behind the mask of objectivity and into the arena of political advocacy can ruin a scientist's credibility and his chances for funding (see Pool, 1990).

The reporter may be afraid to ask the scientists tough but important questions, or may be so awed by the complexity of scientific language that the tough questions remain inchoate. Politicians are ridiculed by everyone, from the public who voted for them to the scientists who testify in subcommittees, to the latest editorial or political cartoon exposing both private and professional gaffes.

The Plot: "We Have Met the Enemy, and..."
This play has two interconnected themes. The first is the free reign society has given to science to alter both our habits and our habitat. It is clear that our environment has been drastically, perhaps irrevocably, injured largely as a result of "progress". Moreover, the process of environmental degradation has accelerated in recent years, even though more public attention has been focused on this problem. Our attachment to technology has dictated that we face new and despicable alternatives. If hazardous waste is to be produced, we must dispose of it. Dispose is a word whose meaning deserves thought. It implies that the waste will disappear, but in reality, science has not yet perfected that magic trick. Our waste will be with us for a long time. We may not see it, but already we breathe it, eat it, and drink it.

The second theme is about responsibility and blame, trust and deception. Singularly, we did not create this mess, therefore we are not responsible. It is someone else's fault. As if self-deception were not enough, the actors have chosen to deceive each other. Each one speaks a foreign, if familiar sounding, language. True communication is not possible; in this play it appears to be undesirable. If each actor were to speak the truth in a common tongue, might the consequences be even more disastrous?

Costumes: "If Only I Could See Their Faces"
The actors are dressed almost identically, except for their masks. The scientists are wearing masks of objectivity and aloofness; they also wear silly crowns. The public mask is childlike and apathetic. Media wears the mask of a beauty queen; she carries a shovel, but appears not to understand its use. The politicians, though lean, wear the masks of fat men and they carry utensils in their pockets, waiting only for dishes.

Epilogue: "Whose Play is This, After All?"
The play is over. Who are we waiting for? Not Godot again? "The show will begin again in fifteen minutes", Sisyphus sighs. "Please remain seated. The exit is blocked; no one may leave", Sartre pronounces in sarcasm. The characters, having removed their masks, are casting about the audience for a new author. The audience is reluctant; they have never written a play before, they say. "But you wrote this one", scream the actors in unison.

References and Suggested Reading
Associated Press, 1991, Town Opposed to Nuclear Dump Plan: El Paso Times, September 17,
1991, p. 2B.

Barzun, J., 1964, The Glorious Entertainment: Science: Harper & Row Pub., New York NY.

Etzioni, Amitai, 1968, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes: The Free Press, New York NY.

Etzioni, Amitai, 1988, The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics: The Free Press, New York NY.

Gamboa, Suzanne, 1990, Engineer Defends Memo in Nuclear-dump Testimony: El Paso Herald-Post, September 21, 1990.

Hempel, Carl G., 1966, Philosophy of Natural Science: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs NJ.

Kehew, Alan E., 1991, Environmental Geology: Geotimes, February, p. 50-51.

Kidd, Bill, 1991, El Pasoan Lands Waste-board Post: El Paso Herald-Post, June 13, 1991, p. A1-A10.

Kuhn, Thomas S., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 2^nd Ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

Machlup, F.,1962, The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States: Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.

Mitcham, Carl, 1989, In Search of a Now Relation between Science, Technology and Society: Technology in Society, v. 11, no. 4, p. 409-417.

National Geographic Society, Cartographic Division, 1982, The Making of America: The Southwest: National Geographic Magazine, Washington, D.C.

Pool, Robert, 1990, Struggling to Do Science for Society: Science v. 248, no. 4956, p. 672-673.

Ravetz, Jerome R., 1971, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems: Oxford University Press, New York NY.

Scharrer, G3ary, 1991, Dump Site Move Wins Tentative OK: El Paso Times, May 16, 1991, p. 1-2A.

Zeckhauser, Richard J. and W. Kip Viscusi, 1990, Risk within Reason: Science, v. 248, p. 559-564.

If most El Pasoans knew that a radioactive waste dump was going to be built 90 mi from the city center or if they know that the dump idea got no further than the 34th District Court before it was tossed out of this corner of West Texas, chances are they know because of the local news media with all their haste, their lack of space or time, their lack of thoroughness. Both the credit and the blame for what we know and don't know about the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority's proposed dump site outside Fort Hancock is given to the media. How well did they do their job?

Not very well, say knowledgeable scientists. Not well at all, say two county officials. Not bad, says the chief county official. Good but not good enough, say three media editors.

Scientists are rarely happy with the news media and UT El Paso geologists are no exception. Diane Doser is not uncomfortable with media attention and media coverage, having spent substantial time in front of the cameras and microphones. While she was still a graduate student in 1983, her professor left town to examine earthquake damage in Idaho, leaving her to be interviewed live by the local television station that evening. Baptism by fire, she calls it.

I learned to start thinking in terms of, simple answers to questions. There's nothing wrong with that and I think more scientists ought to do more of it. It's important for the public to be informed on scientific issues and I'd rather a scientist give a simplified explanation than a non-scientist give the wrong explanation.

But willing as she is to talk to the media and as much as she knows about earthquake hazards in the area (she is director of UTEP's Seismological Observatory) including the potential earthquake hazards at the proposed waste site, Doser was never asked her opinion of the low-level waste dump.

The media seemed to focus on outside consultants. No one ever talked to me about earthquake hazards out at the site but they talked to some consultant from the University of Nevada at Reno. They call me about earthquakes in general or an earthquake that happened somewhere else, but they never called me about this.

While Doser and geology professor Phil Goodell say both the media and the scientific powers in Texas largely ignored UTEP scientists, that doesn't bother UTEP adjunct geology professor and research associate, Mark Baker. He says the news media don't cover science anyway; they cover personalities.

I have a different problem than Diane in that I usually don't give very short answers and tend to get misquoted more. I also tend to say things that have more qualifying statements that often get lost or changed. But I don't think you can get a scientific idea across in a newspaper story or a nightly news show. I think, at best, you can transmit an impression or a personality. You have a better chance in print. But even in print you don't get the full story. What upsets me is when I read or hear about an important piece of legislation concerning the waste site, I don't get what's in the bill; I get what went on around the bill, the personalities, the politics. I don't get facts; I get impressions.

Goodell says if the media understood the scientific issues better, they would be able to discuss the issues rather than the personalities:

I don't even think most of them have skimmed through the literature. They need to do at least a little bit of homework. There's a wealth of publications that have come out on this issue. They don't even have to read it. Look through the pictures. Look through the diagrams.

And, speaking of pictures, Doser says the media, particularly television, have used the same ones for three years. "Why not show a map? Tell us where it is. Have a geologist use a big map and show where there might be a magnitude seven earthquake."

Baker accuses the media of haste or laziness or both.

The press simply doesn't do its homework and it wouldn't have been that difficult in this case. There were four or five-page quarterly reports written for politicians on this issue and an annual report of about ten pages. It was neither difficult nor long reading and the press certainly had access to the reports. For the most part, they rely on the interview alone.

And only controversial or negative interviews at that, says adjunct UTEP geology professor, Dennis Powers. Powers recently completed the chairmanship of a national committee reviewing challenges to the Department of Energy's nuclear waste program at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. He says the press, but particularly television, loves to show up only when it's controversial or when someone has something negative to say:

Let's take a possible volcano eruption. You can have 99 people saying they're not sure or they don't think it will be terrible and one person saying it will be catastrophic and that's what will get the coverage. I have a "Chicken Little" theory of this: you can say the sky is not failing and be right 99 times out of 100. But the news media will only remember the one time you were wrong. on the other hand, you can run around like Chicken Little and say the sky is falling and be wrong 99 times out of 100. But the media will remember the one time you were right. This is the real problem with news coverage. The responsible scientist is out playing by the rules and the politicians who want to get reelected or the person who wants publicity so they can influence an issue are not playing by the same rules.

And the scientific method Itself seems antithetical to news coverage, says UTEP geology professor David LeMone and an advisor on the waste site for El Paso County:

I think it's very difficult to reduce a complex scientific problem to a very simple statement. What invariably happens is that the statement becomes distorted. You lose the parameters. General statements get you in trouble in science. They're used all the time in news.

What was not covered is as important to these scientists as what was covered, Baker, who was hired by the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology to conduct studies on the geologic impact of the waste site, believes the news media missed some good, and obvious, stories:

What is the definition of low-level waste? It is defined as whatever is not high-level. High-level is defined as spent reactor fuel rods and nuclear bomb parts. Anything that is not that is low-level. Pretty frightening, isn't it?

And if the potential earthquake damage is so significant at the site, why is it not significant in downtown El Paso, asks Doser:

If we consider earthquake hazards as a problem at the waste site, then why aren't we worried about, say, the construction of the new county courthouse, some of our freeway interchanges, our water supply, hospitals, and the same in Juarez? If there is a possibility of a big earthquake in Fort Hancock, there is a possibility of one here in the El Paso/Juarez area. The news media only looked at one small part of the earthquake problem.

Powers says laziness and sloppiness are only part of the problem. He accuses the news media of bias as well.

Regardless of many good intentions, I believe, at least as far as nuclear waste is concerned, that most reporters bring their own opinions into the story. And most of the time they are against the waste site and against nuclear energy.

Not so, say two county employees who fought long and hard against the waste site. Darcy Frownfelter and Mark Turnbough believe that bias was the problem but it was bias in the opposite direction. As they see it, the media tilted toward the state's point of view and away from that of the county, reporting the story as country bumpkin lawyer versus the big city lawyer, the big-time scientists from prestigious schools versus the small-time scientists from UTEP -- and the big city boys got the benefit of the doubt.

"The Authority portrayed themselves as people who were conducting the state's business and were being stopped by people who did not want the state's business conducted in their backyard," says Turnbough, a Ph.D. in environmental policy and a land use analyst working as a consultant for the county during Its fight against the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority.

We were thought of as malcontents and troublemakers who were trying to interfere with the Authority who was attempting to do the public good. We didn't have any status with the press because we weren't a state agency.

An attorney specializing in environmental affairs, Frownfelter was hired by the county as a special assistant county attorney to fight El Paso's legal battle against the state. Frownfelter is given much of the credit for defeating the proposed waste site. He agrees with Turnbough that the media gave too much weight and latitude to the Authority.

There is a tendency in the press that if a government official says something then it must be true. The press clippings are full of outrageous statements by Rick Jacobi, the general manager of the Authority, and the press never caught on that the Authority members never knew what they were talking about; they never went behind the statements.

What's ironic about this is that in the normal world of journalism, once a government agency has been found to be fudging a bit on the truth, the press normally zeroes in and goes after what really is behind the story,

says Turnbough.

In this case, once the state had been caught fudging on several stories, the news media basically went to sleep. And if it ever was a close call, and there were plenty, the press immediately assumed the Authority was right. They maintained that bias throughout the entire process. Only when a public opinion poll showed that El Pasoans were overwhelmingly opposed to the dump site did the press start to turn around.

The only exception to media bias, according to Turnbough and Frownfelter, was KVIA TV. Both the El Paso Times and the El Paso Herald Post are accused of giving the last word to the Authority.

It didn't matter whether it was an active fault you were talking about or a hundred year flood plain or a wet land or archaeology of any consequence or recharge of the ground water or fractures or fissures. It didn't matter what it was; if we told the press about it they were highly skeptical. So, they would call up Jacobi and he would say something like 'Oh, that's a desiccation crack or it's a drainage feature of the site and it's no big deal.' So the press would always give the Authority the last paragraph or the last segment of the story so they would always get the last word. Everybody but Channel Seven did this.

Like the scientists, the county spokesmen believe what was not covered was just as important as what was covered. "We used to talk about how any one of us would have loved to have gotten the assignment the Authority was given," says Turnbough.

They got a blank check and ten to fifteen years to find one crummy little site that was suitable for low-level radioactive waste. Think about it: ten years looking for less then 200 acres, less than a section of land, in a state the size of Texas that has as much vacant land as Texas and they still didn't do it right. That isn't a story? That should be a lot of stories."

And there never was a story on the board of directors of the Authority," complains Frownfelter.

For example, one board member was Jim Phillips. He's from El Paso. He's a prominent businessman. He was on the board up until 1987 during a very critical period. The Authority had selected another site in south Texas. Phillips made a motion to table that decision and, in 1986, to designate Fort Hancock as the preferred site. An El Pasoan did this. No one, ever, has covered that.

Luther Jones, former El Paso County Judge and the leader of the fight against the waste site, is more charitable towards the news media. Although he agrees that many stories were left uncovered and the media had a bias towards the Authority, the county's chief politician could hardly complain that science took a back seat to politics in this story.

I was viewing this whole thing from a political angle myself although I knew the scientific angle had to be right or we would never prevail. I wanted to increase the level of public awareness of the hazards to the region of being used as a radioactive storage area and so I was happy for my hyperbolic statements to be reported. Instead of the Authority answering back with a barrage of scientific data, they typically would answer back in the same political tone I used. They sounded like they were county commissioners themselves. And that's one of the reasons their credibility began to be questioned. Instead of calmly answering our statements with scientific data and explanations, they sounded like local politicians. People didn't expect them to operate in a political environment so the lack of coverage of the science involved was an asset to us and a detriment to them.

So, the El Paso news media are perceived to be, at the very least, inadequate in their coverage of the science, incomplete in their coverage of the politics, and, at the most, biased in favor of the Authority.

"Mae culpa," say media editors about the charges of inadequacy and incompleteness. "Hogwash," say media editors about the charges of bias.

Bob Moore is now city editor of the El Paso Times. Between 1985 and 1991, he was both assistant city editor or night city editor, assigning most of the stories on the proposed waste site. He admits that most of the newspaper's coverage was reactive:

Luther Jones, Darcy Frownfelter, Joe Lucas (county attorney), in particular, were very aggressive about getting out to the news media the information they developed as it became available -- various geological surveys, various moves by the Authority. So most of our reporting on this was driven by events. And those events were brought to our attention usually by the county attorney's office or the county judge's office.

Moore calls the Times' coverage good but not great.

I'd give us a 6-1/2 out of 10. I wish we had taken time to examine some of these issues on our own with some independent sources. We should have taken some of the evidence about the fault lines and the flood plain, and some of the other complaints the county had to some independent geologists and said, 'This is what the county is saying; this is what the state is saying; where does the truth lie?' Instead of doing that, we wound up with the county saying this and the state saying that without giving El Pasoans any real perspective.

Moore didn't go to independent observers because of time limitations and he didn't go to UTEP scientists because it didn't occur to him.

This was only one of many important issues that were evolving at the time. The late 1980s and early 1990s were a critical time period here and there were a lot of issues coming up. That was one of the more important ones and I wish we had done a better job on it. And here we have one of the best geology departments in the country sifting on our doorstep and we never tapped that resource. It just got lost in the shuffle as we rushed headlong into this really emotional issue. We got too caught up in the emotion of all of it and didn't step back and gain some perspective.

Bob Moore pleads guilty to covering the personalities better than the science. The Times now has a full-time science reporter but, even with that, he claims science is a continuing problem for daily newspapers:

It's so technical and so involved and goes right over most people's heads. A good science writer's job is to take all this technical information and present it in an understandable form without getting it entirely wrong. That's a difficult challenge.

As to the sloppiness, Moore pleads guilty there as well. He says he was stunned to learn that Jim Phillips had been on the Authority's board of directors until 1987:

And I think that my surprise at Jim Phillips is a good indication that we did not adequately cover the board. We focused on the legislature and I don't think we ever really realized that significance of the board at the time we were covering it.

But Moore makes no apologies for choosing politics over science.

This was a political story from the very beginning. The reason it wound up in West Texas in the first place was not a scientific but a political decision. And what eventually got it moved was not a scientific but a political decision. Moving it became more politically expedient than keeping it here.

And Moore hotly denies any bias towards the Authority:

Hogwash. Hogwash. I think, if anything, the complete opposite is true. People have said a lot of things about Luther Jones but the one thing I've never heard him accused of being was country bumpkin. Using the media was in his overall strategy and he did one of the better jobs I've ever seen done of manipulating the media to accomplish a political agenda. I think he was sincere and I don't blame him. But to say we short-changed the county is ridiculous. El Paso is a very isolated community and people here are much more likely to listen to somebody from here rather than somebody from Austin. And we certainly didn't need anybody to do a poll to tell us that the vast majority of El Pasoans were opposed to this dump site. You would have to have been a complete idiot not to have known that. So, if anyone, the state got short-changed in our coverage, not the county.

Karen Brehm, former city editor of the El Paso Herald Post, is shocked that her would be accused of bias.

Almost from the front end we tried so hard to be balanced. Personally, everyone in this newsroom I know of was opposed to this dump site. As citizens, we didn't want this on our back door and we took editorial stands to that effect. Because of our personal feelings, we tried very hard to get the response from the state every time. If anything, we expected criticism from the state. I never got phone calls accusing us of bias from either side so I think we were pretty balanced.

But there is much Brehm would change about the Post's coverage if she could do it again.

I wish we had done more interpretative articles, more in-depth pieces to provide perspective. I'm not uncomfortable following the news, but I think some of our coverage was too event-driven. Looking back, I would have liked to do an indepth piece on the nature of earthquakes or the nature of flood plains. And we should have profiled all the scientists at UTEP who were working on this issue. It was an oversight.

But, like Moore, Brehm is not uncomfortable with covering personalities. paper

We did cover a lot of personalities but that's because the players became important and that means the personalities were important. They attacked one another and we covered it. We revealed to the public these players as characters and maybe that's where the criticism stems. But we couldn't have ignored them, especially if they were In leadership positions in either opposition or support.

Brehm says her newspaper did a reasonably good job of informing the public on the issue.

On a scale of one to ten, I'd give us a good seven. The community understood from our coverage that low-level waste was an important issue. I think people know the basic issues now. You have to understand something inherent in newspapers: your daily story might appear to be shallow because it's only eight inches. But at the end of the month, look at the clip file and see how many hundreds of inches you've devoted to one issue. Then look at it at the end of the year and see if you've given the public what they need. Our former editor taught me this. In other words, give them a little bit every day. Studies have shown that readers don't like long stories and seldom read them. I'm not ashamed of the job we did.

KVIA TV was the only El Paso television station to cover the radioactive waste site proposal as an ongoing story assigned to one reporter. Lise Nielson was both a reporter and the assignment editor during the five years of the controversy. When she did not cover the story herself, she assigned it to one reporter and insisted that reporter stay on top of it. Nielsen says she knew, from the beginning, this was issue worth covering in

... more than a cursory manner. It had all the good elements for me: global implications, political machinations. I checked on this story all the time. I went out to the site.

But she knows the issue was not as thoroughly covered as it could have been. Some of that is her fault, she says, "I know I missed a lot of the subtler aspects of the political and scientific game being played. I know our coverage was shallow much of the time."

Some of it is the fault of the viewing audience.

People tune out on legislature video and boardroom video. It isn't exciting. It's important what these guys in a boardroom or the legislature say but it often isn't immediately interesting.

And some of it is the fault of the television medium itself.

We don't have much time to air stories. It takes all day to do a Fort Hancock waste disposal site story and then you have two minutes on the air. And what do you have to look at? The desert, the legislature, a meeting. We could have done better visually but this story would never have been as visually interesting as a hard news story. This story is hard to visualize. That's not an excuse but it's, a consideration.

And so it ends, this airing grievances, giving explanations, making amends, taking sides. What happens next time? The county government employees believe they were slighted and misjudged by the media. The media vehemently deny both so there seems to be no compromise possible between these two groups. The media accepted most of the criticism handed out by the scientists. The editors agree they covered too little of the science involved in the waste disposal story and vow to increase their science inches and expand their science perspective.

Is there nothing scientists can do to help them? When UTEP geologist were ignored as a source, they did not complain. When reporters missed the connection between possible earthquake damage to the waste site and possible earthquake damage to downtown El Paso, scientists remained silent. When reporters failed to ask precise enough questions of the waste authority on the type of waste to be buried at the site, scientists did not provide the right questions.

The problem is science itself. As Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann discovered, there is no mercy for the scientist who bypasses scientific publishing procedure and promotes himself. Diane Doser hinted to the media that they were too limited in their thinking about possible earthquake damage but was too uncomfortable to hand them the story of the same fault line at the waste site running through the middle of the new courthouse. No geologist picked up the phone and asked, "What about us?" when they were overlooked by reporters, or offered reporters a set of questions for the Authority.

That is unlikely to change. A scientist who offers unsolicited advice and stakes out a solo public opinion is a maverick and an object of suspicion to his peers. But the scientist need not stand alone. There was enough agreement among the UTEP geologists about the failings of the media that they could have stood together as a department and issued a statement or series of statements. And if that is still deemed too risky or too presumptuous, another formal layer can be inserted into the process. The scientists could submit positions singly or in groups to another set of scientists for review -- perhaps the Bureau of Economic Geology -- thus preserving the scrutiny required for good science while still offering the valuable source required for good journalism.

The stakes are too high in today's complex world for scientists to remain aloof and neutral. They must participate in providing science information or risk part of the blame when that information is wrong.

First, let me heartily congratulate the authors for putting together this booklet. Its stated purpose of educating the public about the scientific and sociological problems surrounding the radioactive waste controversy at Fort Hancock is laudable. The clash between scientists and the public is growing more serious all the time. I know firsthand.

I have dealt with this question for over 9 years on this project and for almost as long on the much maligned South Texas project nuclear power plant before that. I see It on almost any large construction project nowadays - be it a chemical refinery, a coastal resort, a dam or any other major development. My own neighborhood association Is opposing a nearby fire station because of "noise pollution" associated with the sirens on the trucks. I seems to me that public distrust of scientists, engineers and government technocrats has increased exponentially over the last 19 years. Clearly, something must be done.

This publication Is a good illustration of the problem. Even among the well educated professors who prepared these entertaining and Insightful papers, there is much confusion about the facts surrounding the selection and the downfall of the ill-fated Fort Hancock waste disposal she. I wish I had the time or the opportunity to set the record straight, but h seems to me that it is time to move on and tackle other more pressing problems.

I don't mean to say that this exercise is not useful. I found this collection of papers very interesting. I made It required reading for our entire staff. I sent ft to my Board of Directors and suggested that they should read it. I even sent It to the engineers and scientists who have worked on this project from time to time over the years. I called Dr. Byrd to tell her how much I enjoyed her analysis of the media coverage of the controversy. I had the opportunity to engage in spirited, but friendly, debate with Dr. Neighbor about his analysis of the politics surrounding the selection of Fort Hancock. But, I do regret that it is being rushed to publication without further research and editing. With just a little more work, this publication could be an excellent book-quality analysis of science and public policy.

Because everyone else did, I guess Its fair for me to speculate a little about what was right and what was wrong with the Fort Hancock site proposal.

First, let me talk about what was right about the proposal. To do so, I have prepared a chart comparing the three sites that were discussed during the trial. As you can see, in my opinion, each site had good points and some not so good points.- Could any one of them really be called the "best' site? I think not. All of the sites were 'suitable'. On purely technical grounds, any one of them would have been a good waste disposal site.

Given the opinion of the technical experts that good sites could be found throughout Texas, the state legislature exercised Its prerogative to rely on other factors to choose among them. It set out new selection factors. Give preference to state-owned land, they said. Stay at least 20 miles away from water reservoirs. Put R In the desert of west Texas, on barren land already owned by the state, where the population density is much lower than R is in east Texas. This pointed to a Hudspeth County site, and there is nothing wrong with that.

On the other hand, this manner of selecting sites, while perfectly legitimate, raises questions about the equity and the purity of the process. These somewhat intangible issues are very tough for the public to understand. When they do finally sort them out, they frequently do not like the results - especially if the result is the siting of an unwanted facility near them.

So, was the siting of the Fort Hancock site a result of a Machiavellian conspiracy by the Texas Legislature and Incompetent technocracy, as suggested by Dr. Neighbor in his analysis? No, of course not. It was the result of a combination of technical, sociological and, yes, political factors that made the Fort Hancock site the most suitable site for a mixture of all of these reasons. Given that the sites under consideration were all considered technically suitable, the Legislature was free to use other sociopolitical factors in arriving at their final decision.

Dr. Howard, in her sociological analysis, correctly points out that it is arrogant for scientists to assume that decisions about unwanted facilities can be made by using sophisticated mathematical formulas to precisely quantify risk. I couldn't agree with her more.

This is the path the Authority started to follow early in the site selection process. It is the path that we followed in advocating the Fort Hancock site. Remember the testimony at the trial? Hours of testimony by world class geologists about the recurrence intervals of earthquakes. Mind boggling scientific speculation about the movement of water 500 feet below the ground. Scientific semantics: was it an alluvial apron, an alluvial plain, or an alluvial fan? Not even the experts could agree. Numbing discussions about the 0.01 probability of a flash flood on the site. In reality, it simply did not matter. The real question was how do the people feel about the site? In the end, h was not a pure scientific decision, it was laced with value judgments.

For all the millions of dollars we spent gathering scientific data from the best scientists and engineers In Texas, the final decision came down to a political decision based on valued judgements. If the decision had been based only on scientific risk analysis, Fort Hancock would have been selected. But it wasn't. The final decision to abandon the site was driven by El Paso County Judge Alicia Chacon and Governor Ann Richards saying 'All right! Enough is enough! Let's find a site that is scientifically sound and acceptable based on the value judgments of the public." In the end, this meant moving the site a mere 30 miles farther away from El Paso.

In her analysis, Lynda Lynch, a longtime opponent of any site in Hudspeth County, calls this a farce. She berates the El Paso County officials and the El Paso media for calling this move a victory.

She's right. Moving the site was a shallow victory - not only for El Paso County, but also for the State of Texas. El Paso spent almost .000,000 to move the site just a few miles down the road.

Who actually won? Luther Jones didn't. The public turned him out of office anyway. Gayle Garner did. He avoided the possibility of having his victory in the district court overturned by the appellate court. A very real possibility. Darcy Frownfelter and Mark Turnbough did. They walked away with a winning reputation in the El Paso area. The State of Texas, and by "the State" I mean you and me and everyone else who lives here, didn't. For a measly 30 miles and saving the reputations of a few local politicians, the state squandered several millions of dollars in abandoning the Fort Hancock site. Was it worth It? I guess that depends on your value judgment.

What about the media? Did they accurately report the facts about these sites, about the process and about the personalities surrounding the controversy? I don't think so. Surprisingly, the opponents don't think so either. Of all the findings reported In these series of papers, I am most astounded by Dr. Byrd's report that the opponents felt the El Paso papers were biased In favor of the Authority. How absurd! The editors were definitely biased in favor of the local officials and the opponents of the site.

What can I add to the discussion by the editors themselves? The coverage was inadequate, if the purpose was to inform the public of the Intricate, complex details of the site selection. The focus on personalities, Instead of the scientific issues, was right, if the purpose was to sell tabloid type news. Many Important issues went unreported. Many trivial issues were over reported. News was event driven. The press was manipulated by local politicians, most notably by Luther Jones, But, on the whole, I have to agree with Karen Brehm. On a scale of one to ten, the El Paso papers deserve a seven for their coverage of the controversy.

In summary, I guess I can say I learned a few things, ['have a much more indepth knowledge of the workings of the legislative process, politics, our legal system, the business of journalism and the media. I have a deeper respect for the Important interaction between sociology and science. I firmly believe that students of engineering and science should be required to take courses In sociology and political science; and students of sociology and political science should be required to take courses in science and engineering. Maybe - just maybe - we can all find a common ground from which to work.

Only then will we be able to move forward.
 TABLE 1. SITE SELECTION

Selection Criteria	Tilden	Asherton	Fort Hancock
Geological Complexity	Not complex, but the presence of salt diapirs and growth faults needed evaluation.	Not complex, but the presence of sandstone and nearby fissures needed evaluation	Not complex, but the presence of nearby inactive faults and fissures needed evaluation
Topography	Relatively flat and above the flood plain	Relatively flat and above the flood plain	Relatively flat and above the floodplain
Transportation Access	Access via state highways including passage through towns	Access via state highways including passage through towns	Access via Interstate highway; no passage through any town.
Meteorology	In a zone of moderate storm intensity. Hurricane hazards. Rainfall is 25O per year	In a zone of moderate storm intensity. Hurricane hazards. Rainfall is 21O per year.	In a zone of low storm intensity. No hurricane hazards. Rainfall is 8O per year.
Population Density	0.68 percent per square mile	8.46 persons per square mile	0.60 persons per square mile
Upstream Drainage	Easily managed	Easily managed	Upstream diversion berms required
Surface Water Hydrology	Site is well above the floodplain on topographic high	Site is above floodplain	Site is above the floodplain
Groundwater Hydrology	Groundwater at 80 ft depth	Groundwater at 80 ft depth. Recharge through sand possible	Depth to water in excess of 500 ft
Aquifer Recharge	Not on recharge	Not on recharged	Not on recharge
Flora and Fauna	No endangered species on site	No endangered species on site	No endangered species on site
Current Land Use	Rangeland	Rangeland and farming	Rangeland
Tectonics and Vulcanism	No evidence of faulting	Fractured sandstone needs further study	Nearby inactive fault needs study
Surface Stability	Shrink and swell of clay needs study	Nearby fissure and clay fractures need study	Fissures need study
Conflicting Facilities	In-situ leaching facility nearby	No conflicts except for utility easements	No conflicts
Adjacent Parks	No conflicts	No conflicts	No conflicts
Archaeological Conflicts	Limited findings on site	No conflicts	No conflicts on site. Rock art site 4 mi north
Recoverable Natural Resources	Significant oil and gas in area. Clay and uranium mining	Oil and gas in area	No conflicts
Ability to Model	Uniform massive clay	Some subsurface fracturing and jointing	Uniform clay with some caliche and sand

 

Storyteller Woman
From the "red-eye" Southwest Airline flight to Austin you can see Alamo Canyon below. As you climb in a southerly curve around El Paso and head down the Rio Grande, the smog clear$ and the Hueco and Finlay Mountains grade into Rio Grande Valley. Near the south end of the mountain chain is a big horseshoe canyon with a dike across the mouth. From the air, in the early morning light, it is alive with color and form.

On the ground, at midday, the canyon is a forbidding and bleak place. The sun blasts you in the open floor of the canyon, and flattens the landscape. But along the canyon edges, where giant spalls from the rim have broken down the slope, are cool sheltered spaces, among the rocks. As you pick your way among the rocks, you find figures and designs pecked onto the stone. In one such place, on a boulder 50 yards long, is carved the legend of a journey, the storyteller panel, as archaeologist Alex Apostolides calls it. It begins with an icon of the storyteller, and in its jumble of zigzags and geometric lines and zoomorphic figures, it records the epic history of the Jornada people who lived in this place a thousand years before us.

Today Alamo Canyon is remote and inaccessible. The desert tracks that lead there aren't impassable, but the lacy network of roads are confusing and there are deep trenches where water softens the trail after storms. Once you get to the canyon you need a guide to find the rock art, as it is scattered among the boulders for miles along the scarp. It has been known as a fabulous place among archaeologists for many years, and by the local cowboys for many before that. But it has been a secret from the casual visitor, and for that reason it has been safe from the abuse that has ruined so many archaeological sites around the Southwest. The graffiti that lifters the surface of rocks at places in the public trust like the Hueco Tanks State Park are mostly absent from Alamo Canyon.

Sometime in the spring of 1985 a group of consultants eyeballed the map of western Hudspeth County, and, finding nothing there but a few ragged hills and a big expanse of empty space, declared that it would be a good place to dump radioactive waste. They had been stymied by the folks of South Texas and San Antonio, who didn't appreciate the thought of being irradiated by high-tech garbage from Boston. They turned to the area around Alamo Canyon because it appeared that there would be no serious problems and few neighbors to oppose it. Unfortunately for the Low Level Radioactive Waste Authority, their site selection incited a barrage of opposition from El Paso County and other concerned citizens, which led to litigation directed at the Authority to withdraw the site from consideration.

After engaging in critical studies of the environmental constraints of the site, the Plaintiffs found a number of problems. Among these was the discovery that the proposed dump was situated within 3 mi of Alamo Canyon. The Authority had done their own cultural resource survey of the area. It was a "windshield" survey, which, along with records searches in the state archaeological archives, is usually an acceptable level of survey for the planning stages of major projects. In this case, the windshield survey was misleading. It was limited to the dump site itself, and didn't consider the proximity of the Alamo Canyon rock art. Furthermore, nothing was found on the two square-mile dump site itself.

This finding by consultants for the Authority was unfortunate for their planning process. Local archaeologists are all familiar with the abundance of ephemeral sites on the bolson. Archaeologists at Fort Bliss are weary from recording the 12,000 sites that they have found, most of which consists of a few pieces of fire-cracked rock, some broken chart from tool-making, and a few indistinct soil stains which indicate a living surface where the grease from food preparation and other activities has left its subtle mark. Sites aren't necessarily everywhere on the bolson, but in an area near the mouth of a major canyon such as Alamo they would be expected. In fact, when the plaintiffs ordered a resurvey, 7 cultural resource sites were found in a sample walk-over of only half of the dump site land surface. These sites were not in themselves very exciting even to the archaeologists. They were mixed in the sand and shrubs and probably disturbed by centuries of blowing and filing. Nonetheless, in an area where various sites have been recorded and even fewer formal surveys have been conducted, all cultural resource sites are important, and protected under both federal and state law. Even these seven sites, "although visually unimpressive," were potentially significant cultural resources as the Plaintiff's archaeologists concluded. Together with the proximity to the Alamo Canyon rock art, and the likelihood that construction and development of the area would increase visitation and impacts on the site, these were powerful legal constraints against the dump site.

The Regulatory Background
Cultural resources are tangible expressions of human cultural diversity, both present and past. As such, they are an important part of the nation's heritage and have been singled out for protection in legislation at every level of government. In the words of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA),

... the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people (Public Law 89-665 as amended).

The federal government has taken the lead in the protection of cultural resources, with legislation protecting sites on public land dating back to the Antiquity Act of 1906 (Public Law 59-209). Various other legislative efforts were enacted, culminating in the 1966 NHPA, one of the most comprehensive pieces of historic preservation legislation in the world. One of the unique aspects of this act, in contradistinction to earlier, more specific legislation, is that it requires protection of resources not only on Federal land, but also land affected by Federal actions, that is, Federal funding or permits.

The National Environmental Preservation Act also requires a consideration of the cultural environment but it is rarely invoked in the protection of cultural resources. The NHPA, and other Federal antiquities legislation, such as the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1980, also have important implications for the protection of archaeological resources.

As noted above, the NHPA is invoked by the presence of Federal land or the involvement of Federal funding or permits (such as Bureau of Reclamation permits or Environmental Protection Agency funds). The NHPA creates the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP), a list of "district, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history" and the Advisory Council for Historic Preservation (ACHP), a government agency which oversees historic preservation. Section 106 of the NHPA states that the ACHP must be afforded the chance to comment when any cultural resources eligible for inclusion on the NRHP are present in an area affected by Federal agency actions or actions funded or permitted by Federal agencies. The Federal regulatory process is described in detail in the ACHP regulations, 36 CFR 800. At the State level, the NHPA is administered by the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). The Texas SHPO office is part of the Texas Historical Commission in Austin. The SHPO is effectively a local representative of the ACHP, responsible for evaluation of the significance of local resources.

Protection of cultural resources under Federal law is tied to eligibility for the NRHP Places which depends on site "significance" as defined by National Park Service (NPS) rules 36 CFR 60. Sites which are deemed significant may receive protection while sites which are recognized as "not eligible" for the NRHP are generally not protected. Measures of protection are based in part on the type and Integrity of the resource, the degree of impact, if any, by the project and the cultural context of the resource. Sites which are not adversely impacted by a project may simply be left alone while endangered sites often require some further action such as preservation, relocation or documentation.

In addition to the Federal codes, cultural resources located on land owned or controlled by political subdivisions of the State are protected by the Texas Antiquities Code (Texas Natural Resources Code, Title 9, Chapter 191) which identifies all such sites on land belonging to municipalities, water districts, and their political subdivisions as State Archaeological Landmarks (SALs). As a political subdivision of the State, the EPCLVWDA is responsible for complying with the provisions of the code. Should any potential sites located on lands earmarked for water of wastewater lines or wastewater treatment plant construction be eligible for formal designation of landmark status under the code, some measure of protection or mitigation of impact may be necessary. The formal designation of SALs and their administration is the responsibility of the Texas Antiquities Committee (TAC).

In effect, both State and Federal codes, as currently interpreted, generally require a complete archaeological survey to be undertaken in conjunction with projects which fall under their purview, particularly in previously unsurveyed areas in regions where cultural resources are expected. Sites discovered during survey must be evaluated for their potential as formally designated SALs and/or their eligibility to the NRHP. If significant resources are located during archaeological survey conducted under the auspices of the Texas Antiquities Code or NHPA, these resources must be protected or their destruction mitigated by approved data recovery programs.

This was one of the snags that impaled the Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority in their selection of the Fort Hancock dump site. Not only had they not critically evaluated the area for the possibility of cultural resource sites on or near the project, they had not taken seriously the impact that cultural resources could have on their decisions.

Desert Harvest
In this desert, in western Hudspeth County, the archaeological sites are hidden and obscure. You have to train your eyes to look at the small and the insignificant things, and focus away from the enormous landscapes. A few flakes of chart, a few stones from a campfire, a ring midden where burned rock was dug form pits where the hot stones had baked sotol and agave hearts for wandering natives, are the seem traces that people have left on this landscape. Prehistoric peoples have inhabited this place for many years and left few traces. It's odd that we, who have been here for only a few decades, have already scarred the land for centuries. With radioactive waste, the scars will last for many millennia.

The sites that have been left behind by the native people of the region show that they made use of a wide diversity of plants and animals. Their campsites in the bolson were apparently for short-term hunting, and the charred rabbit bones found on many of these attest to their prey. The ring middens along the flanks of the mountains show a focus, probably seasonal, on the harvest of succulent plants like the sotol and agave. Larger camps near alluvial fans lower from the river as well as game and wild plants were locally available. These alluvial fans may even have been the first agricultural fields, which Jornada people may have used as small informal gardens long before the pueblo peoples in the region practiced farming for a large part of their sustenance. Their sites, both ephemeral and longer term, were purposefully scattered through the landscape, where and when fruitful resources were found. Others, outside the region, may have been a part of these peoples larger world. Just as historic period peoples traveled to the southern Plains to hunt bison, prehistoric peoples of the Trans-Pecos may have left their homeland for these seasonal hunts. The absence of sites in one place may be suggestive of their presence in others.

Significance
In many archaeological landscapes it is easy to evaluate the significance of cultural resource sites. In the desert of West Texas, however, a given site may not appear to be significant, and may not in itself possess the necessary attributes of integrity and significance to quality for protection under federal law. However, as parts of larger patterns of settlement, each ephemeral and fragile site in the desert is an integral and potentially significant nexus of information. How did this site fit into the lifeways of the people? When was it occupied, and how does it compare to their sties from the same period? What were the resources that were used to make tools? Were they obtained locally, or from a distant source? What plants or animals were harvested?

Since each site provides only a very partial slice of prehistoric life, they must be studied in larger units of observation and discovery. Archaeological survey has adapted to the need for finding and recording these disparate and elusive bits of information, and there has developed in recent years a considerable methodology for analyzing and interpreting the patterns and systems of settlement. Of course, when sites as dramatic as the rock art of Alamo Canyon are found, their significance is self-evident.

Much to the dismay of the Waste Authority, the Advisory Council for Historic Preservation quickly accepted the nomination of Alamo Canyon as a multiple property district to the National Register of Historic Places. There was no longer any question about the legal status of the rock art, and much potential for National Register and State Archaeological Landmark status for even the ephemeral lithic scatters in the dump site itself. Since these latter sites, though not in themselves dramatic or impressive, were clearly nodes in a complex system of living for prehistoric peoples, they too were imbued with legal "significance" and full protection under federal and state land.

What Is the Meaning of All This?
The low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority knew in advance about the need to consider cultural resources. Historical preservation is only one of many legal hurdles that public domain projects must clear. ft is the responsibility of the state and federal agencies to accept this responsibility and report undertakings and possible impact to the State Historic Preservation Officer in the state where the projects are being proposed. Ignoring the mandate does not absolve the agency of responsibility. In fact, serious consequences such as revocation of necessary permits, licenses, or funding are stipulated when cultural resource law is avoided. Worthwhile projects, even though clearly in the best public interest, may not sidestep this responsibility even where it may seriously limit the proposed project. The federal law has been tested many times, and it has been upheld each time.

The Waste Disposal Authority included cultural resource investigations in their planning process. Unfortunately, they grossly underestimated both the extent and the significance of the resources In the area of their project. When contested by El Paso County, they grossly underestimated the quickness and the resolve of the Advisory Council of Historic Preservation (pers. commun., Darcy Frownfelter). They had failed to adequately assess both the spirit and the letter of the law.

The peoples, living and dead, teamed up in western Hudspeth County to protest the exercise of bureaucracy. While cultural resource protection was only a part of a much more extensive complaint, it nonetheless was a potent tool for preserving the public interest. The interest that fought off the radioactive dump validated the importance of cultural resource preservation by their use of it as a legal tool. We can only hope that their own policy and planning will address their own preservation needs and requirements. Not to do so subjects them to the same consequences as the radwaste siting bunch, who are now under the gun to find a dump site by 1993 as they were originally mandated to do.

This Empty Vessel, This Desert
This desert region is a fickle place to live. When John Wesley Powell first explored for the government in the late nineteenth century, he exulted in the beauty and sheer exuberance of the American west, but warned against trying to harness its resources. It can be an empty shell, an empty vessel, without water. But with irrigation, as legions have found, it transforms itself into a cornucopia, though the harvest is ripped from the substance of the shell. Powell warned against expecting too much from its fragile complexion. Our actions in the west are imprinted forcefully on the landscape. From clear cut timbering to salt-wasted floodplain to barren flats where lakes once lay, we have tested the limits of the region, The dustbowl and other tragedies are testament to our folly. We rely, along with everyone else these days in this proud land, on our ability to come up with quick fixes to patch up the errors of the past and persevere into the near-future.

El Paso, El Pasado, Los Pasaron
The Storyteller of Alamo Canyon faces inward at the ends of the petroglyph panel, as through the encapsulate an epic of her people. The panel may be, as Apostolides says, a record of the journey of the people through difficult times. Whether allegory or culture history, it is a shrine to the lives and lifeways of those who have passed by this place. The rock art of Alamo Canyon, and the flake scatters on the canyon floor -- aren't they at least as worthy of preservation as several thousand cans of radioactive waste? If we can accommodate the debris from nuclear waste with all the imperiousness of state power, then we ought, also, to consider the archaeological trash of a people who left much less destructive traces of their passing. 

The fundamental criteria to which the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority (the Authority) and its consultants have adhered to with respect to geology consists of three basic, exclusionary tenets: 1) complex geology, 2) major tectonic fault zones, and 3) major mountain areas. The NTP-S34 (Fort Hancock) site fails to quality in all three respects, Dames and Moore (1985) define each of these "fatal flaw" points in detail.

The first, fundamental criterion is called complex geology. This involves three basic points; they are: 1) number of rock units per unit area, 2) the presence of folds and faults, and 3) the presence of joint sets/systems in the in situ rock units. The rocks exposed at the surface in the area reveal a Mesozoic and Cenozoic sequence which includes a system of seven interrelated, very complex, sedimentary units composed of carbonates and clastics. The worst problem exists in reference to the recorded presence of faults and folds. Utilizing what is known structurally in the El Paso and Sierra Blanca areas, combined with the published data on the Haymon Krupp, No. 1 Thaxton wildcat, south of the NTP-S34 site, the area is underlain by either a thrust fault or the complex terminus of a thrust fault. The complexity of the structure involved in reference to the thrust, to say nothing of the complexity of the pattern of the sediments and sedimentary rocks related to it, make site characterization an impossible task. The minimal trace of this thrust fault is not carried from the Albritton and Smith map (1965) to the Kreitler et al. (1987) Plate 3 (Geological Map). An additional complexity is the presence of a surface monoclinal flexure with a minimum of 900 ft of relief going into the site area at a distance of less than 2 mi from the corner of the NTP-S34 site. The difference in elevation between the Rimrock Finlay top and the top of the Finlay in the Thaxton well is on the order of 4000 ft. A 4-1/2 mi normal fault occurs near the top of the monocline with a small associated graben. One can speculate as to whether or not the monoclinal flexure is converted into a major fault or faults at depth. Joint sets/systems are interrelated to the thrusting, normal faulting, and the monoclinal flexure. Axial planar fractures may alter significantly the permeability of the Mesozoic rocks exposed along the Rimrock. The presence of conjugate fracture sets may or may not be present, further altering the rock. The important thing to remember about the complex geology is that reduces site characterization to an Impossible task. In order to model, monitor, and analyze a site, the site should be homogeneous enough to permit adequate characterization for appropriate performance assessment.

The second basic exclusionary criterion is that the site must not be in an area of major tectonic fault zones. ft would be difficult to select a more negative area than that of the NTP-S34 site in the state of Texas. ft rests on the margin between the northern, stable, North American tectonic block (Diablo platform) and a mobile, secreting, southern tectonic block (Chihuahua tectonic belt). Structural movement along the interface has been active for the past 1400 m.y. (Muehlberger, 1980). It lies on the northeastern margin of the deeply faulted, Hueco bolson segment of the Rio Grande rift. The site is on the classic Texas lineament (Clint and Campo Grande faults).

The last basic exclusion is that the site must not be in a major mountain area. The Rimrock does not qualify as a mountain area; however, it should be noted that the topographic elevation difference from the top of Pear Canyon drainage into the site area is on the order of I 000 ft.

In addition to the basic tenets that were established by the Authority and its consultants, a set of considerations for site selection were adopted in November of 1982. These considerations (24 Items) were later reduced to 19 criteria for site selection in March of 1985, three months prior to the first mention of NTP-S34. The site violates exclusion criteria 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 12, as well as inclusion criteria 18 and 19.

Exclusions

1.Disposal sites shall not be located in the 100-year floodplain, coastal high-hazard zone, or wetlands. The surface flood map (Fig. 8) of NTP-S34 shows that the area is crisscrossed with the exclusionary 100-year flood designation (November, 1984).

2.The site should be located so that drainage is minimal and easily manageable. This generally indicates an area with an existing grade of 5% or less. There is approximately a 1000 foot elevation difference between the top of the Rimrock and the NTP-S-34 site immediately to the north in the Pear Canyon drainage. The Pear Canyon drainage system goes directly into the site area.

3.The site shall not be located on the recharge zone of the major or minor aquifers of Texas. It seems reasonable and evident to interpret that the site area is interpreted to be a significant factor for recharge of the Cretaceous sequence and bolson fill groundwater aquifer systems, and ultimately, the Rio Grande alluvium.

4.Areas must be avoided where tectonic processes, such as faulting, folding, seismic activity, or vulcanism occur with such frequency and extent as to significantly affect site performance. In addition to the commentary in reference to folding and faulting discussed under complex geology, the area has seismic risk and is on direct trend line with mid-Tertiary vulcanism as expressed at Sierra Blanca and the Finlay Mountains (4 mi from the NTPS34 site).

5.Areas should be avoided where surface geological processes such as mass wasting, erosion, slumping, landsliding, and weathering occur with such frequency and severity as to adversely affect site performance. The rate of lateral erosion, for example, is unknown in this area. Please note on the surface flood map that the area is divided into two drainage systems. The majority of the area is in the aggrading drainages draining into the Alamo Arroyo. In the southeastern corner, lateral erosion of the deeply incised Camp Rice Arroyo could be a significant factor in the future 500-year history of the NTP-S34 site.

6.The site shall not be located in an area where severe meteorological conditions such as tornadoes, excessive winds, or thunderstorms occur with sufficient frequency as to adversely affect site performance. The area has a long historical record of seasonal heavy rains (cloudbursts) probably caused in part by difference in elevation (orographic effect) between the site area and the higher Rimrock. Excessive winds are characteristic of the area as evidenced by surficial windblown sands.

7.The site should be located in an area of minimal archaeological significance but should not be located adjacent to a historic site designated by the State Historical Commission. The earlier reconnaissance report by Skinner (1986) should be disregarded in favor of the recently completed, more thorough, Batcho et al. (1988) survey which lists both significant archaeological and historical site.

Inclusions
1.The site should be located such that transportation problems are minimized. The site exists at the farthest point in the state of Texas from the source of the low-level radioactive waste. Increased quantities of low-level radioactive waste in combination with long haulage distance of increased unit (truck) numbers in convoys represent a major future hazard to the drivers and citizens of Texas.

2.The site, should be capable of being characterized, modeled, analyzed, and monitored. The NTP-S34 site cannot be characterized, modeled, analyzed, or monitored because of the complex structural, stratigraphic, and hydrologic problems of the area.

 References Cited
Albritton, C.C., and J.F. Smith Jr., 1965, Geology of the Sierra Blanca area, Hudspeth County, Texas: U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. Paper 479, 131 p.

Batcho, David, M.R. Miller III, Trace Stuart, and Wayne Howell, 1988, Preliminary archaeological surveys and documentation of pteroglyph sites in western Hudspeth County, Texas: Batcho and Kauffman Associates: Cultural Resources Report, No. 37, 40 p.

Dames and Moore, 1985, Siting of a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility in Texas: Evaluation of State-owned Lands: Volume III (issued October, 1985).

Kreltier, C.W., J.A. Raney, R. Nativ, E.W. Collins, W.F. Mullicfan III, T.C. Gustavson, and C.D. Henry, 1987, Siting a low-level radioactivity waste disposal facility in Texas: Volume Four, Geology and Hydrological Investigations of State of Texas and University of Texas Lands: Bur. Econ. Geol. (issued August, 1987), 330 p.

Muehlberger, W.R., 1980, Texas Lineament revisited; in P.W. Dickerson and J.M. Hoffer (eds.), Trans-Pecos Region: New Mexico Geol. Soc., 31st Field Conf., p. 113-121.

Skinner, S.A., 1986, Cultural resources reconnaissance of the Fort Hancock Site, Hudspeth County, Texas: Cultural Resources Report 86-8 (issued August 4,, 1986), 24 p. 

Monday evening, September 16, 1991, Hudspeth County residents gathered in Sierra Blanca to share their concerns over the proposed siting of a highly toxic radioactive waste dump near their town. For many in attendance, this subject has been a familiar one for eight long years.

Late in the Fall of 1983, Mary Lynch, editor of the Hudspeth County Herald and Dell Valley Review, received a telephone call from an out-of-town journalist inquiring as to residents' feelings regarding the placement of a radioactive waste dump in Hudspeth County, at that time near the town of Dell City. it was the first notification the county resident had as to the dumps proposed existence and would soon lead to the knowledge that Hudspeth County had been quietly slated for the dump months before, by the now well known Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority (the "Authority"). It appeared that it was the Authority's intention to keep the project under wraps from the public as long as possible. Residents were alarmed and thus began the long and arduous battle between concerned citizens in Hudspeth County and the Authority. The battle would eventually involve three Hudspeth County locations to date, and El Paso County lawsuit.

The Authority came into existence by state law with the blessings of Texas' nuclear industry, as a result of a broader federal law called the "Low-Level Waste Policy Act' of 1980 (a misnomer, "low-level' radioactive waste includes highly toxic plutonium, all nuclear power generated wastes except fuel rods, and can include mixed chemical toxic wastes). That law mandates that all states will take over the industry's responsibility for the "disposal" and liability of low-level wastes by 1993, either by forming compacts (a unit of two or more states with one dump) or by one state creating a single dump of its own use.

No known method of disposal of radioactive wastes has been proven. While the latest "state-of-the-art" nuclear dump is leaking in France, half of the nuclear dumps in the U.S. remain closed and leaking -- with no significant clean up yet accomplished -- 16 years after the first failed dump closed (Kaufman and Moorer, 1991). Hiding behind the misinformation that these wastes are harmless medical byproducts (over 90% of "low-level" waste is nuclear-power generated), the industry insists on releasing the liability of its deadly products. And, because the generators of nuclear waste in the U.S. have adopted their own "not in my backyard" syndrome, the factors currently influencing siting policies revolve largely around finding locations where the local people offer little potent resistance (Kaufman and Moorer, 1991). Simply, the nuclear industry knows the wastes are lethal and does not want accountability.

Little potent resistance was certainly assumed In Hudspeth County by the east Texas utilities, state legislature, and the Authority, when it focused on west Texas. But in fact, public pressure and geological variables forced the abandonment of two Dell City area sites in 1984. One effort made subsequently toward siting in south Texas was thwarted when it was found that the site was too near former governor Dolph Briscoe's ranch. Without scientific judgement, the legislature then ordered the Authority to pursue a site on state-owned land, most of which lies in west Texas. The small community of Ft. Hancock was next on the agenda, where a legal battle ensued on behalf of the interest of nearby El Paso. It ended with the ouster of the Authority by a state district judge, ruling the site unsuitable and that the Authority had repeatedly violated its own siting criteria. However, a deal was struck between El Paso County officials and the governor. which ordered the Authority this time to move a scant 30 mi east to a scientifically anonymous "box:" holding 400 mi<SUP>-2</SUP> of land. Like "pin the tall on the donkey", the Authority was told to get the job done. No one had the necessary extensive geologic or hydrologic studies in hand to assume that a viable site could even be located in "the box".

That move was called a "great victory" by El Paso County officials and press. But the allowance of the dump to be moved only a few miles further east was enormously short-sighted. Rather than take on a comprehensive view of protecting the west Texas region and its resources as a whole, El Paso opted for less. This factor is particularly significant in light of two things: 1)El Paso's interest in buying land for water immediately east of the proposed dump site; and 2) the likelihood that the dump site will be a federal facility, accepting wastes from all 50 states.

Likelihood of groundwater contamination under these circumstances lies within the scenario of not "if" but "when" contamination will occur. Existing technology which already leaks cannot contain the material into the tens of thousands of years which are required. In addition to the nation's closed and leaking low-level waste dumps, a recent investigation by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) found that the groundwater at every Department of Energy weapons site is contaminated (Kaufman and Moorer, 1991). What then are the expectations for the vast underground water supply in Hudspeth County?

Movement along federal lines indicates an increasing national trend to reduce the number of new dump sites initiated. In a letter as recently dated as August 21, 1991, Michigan Governor John Engler supports efforts by congressional Representative Dingell to reopen and ultimately rewrite the federal Low-Level Waste Policy Act; the express intent being that of federalizing the first dump sites to come on line. Texas is among the top five states prepared to site and operate a dump as soon as possible.

In addition, seduced by a 20 million dollar bid from Maine, the state legislature and the governor are investigating the possibility of creating a compact with the state of Maine under the mistaken belief that forming a compact will protect Texas from being forced to accept waste from out of state (this compact would include the burying of the whole dismantled "Yankee Maine" nuclear power plant in Hudspeth County). That protection, which did exist in the original 1980 Act, was dissolved, however, in 1985 with an "emergency access" amendment. The amendment gave the Nuclear Regulatory Commission permanent authority to override any compact or single state decision to ban out-of-state waste. Furthermore, congress has the right to reassess compacts every five years, leaving the door wide open for dump policy changes and its own state overrides. Twenty million dollars, however, would relieve the industry of the financial burden of paying for construction of the site. Not only west Texas, but El Paso will face the stigma and the disease of being a receiving dump for all the nation's nuclear waste.

The great degree of flux and legal uncertainty which characterizes this issue was never acknowledged by El Paso County officials. Nor was it understood by officials of Hudspeth County. Seduced like the governor, by a one million dollar per year bid, Hudspeth County Commissioners and the County Judge met privately, traveled and negotiated on behalf of the site, ultimately releasing a resolution accepting the dump in Hudspeth County without public notice, consent or vote. The meeting of September 16 was the first public meeting to be held in the county regarding this issue and it was called by the citizens. They realized they were witnessing the siting of a dump on their land about which they had never been consulted. Hudspeth County residents have been abandoned by El Paso and sold down the river by their own representatives. There is no question that in this business, money talks! Pentagon cleanup costs estimates range from $100 to $200 billion dollars for the contaminated Department of Energy sites which will require at least 30 years to realize (Kaufman and Moorer, 1991), if it in fact can be realized.

There can be no monetary value placed on the irreplaceable resource of water. Nor can such a value be placed on delicate desert grasslands and mountains which support endless ecosystems of life. Surely, too, no such disregard can occur for the pure sake of an indecent politic. What of this pristine and stoic landscape now that the "Authority" has seized upon its beauty for a dark reality? What of its water, its coyote and antelope? Perhaps we can give some insight through the words of state Senator Bill Sims, who said "I'll be dead by the time it leaks".

References
Bartlett, Donald L., and James B. Steele, 1985, Forevermore: Nuclear Waste in America: W.W. Norton and Co., New York, Chapter 2, p. 48-73

Bryant, Adam, 1986-87, Federal Ruling Permits Unregulated Disposal of Wastes; in Waste Paper: Radioactive Waste Campaign, New York, P. 7 and P. 12.

Federal Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 1982, Low-Level Waste Packet: Nuclear Information Service, Washington, D.C.

Iselin, Cia, 1987, What is High-Level Waste?; in Waste Paper: Radioactive Waste Campaign: New York P. 5.

Jacobi, Lawrence R., 1991, personal communication, General Manager, Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority, regarding superiority of certain privately-owned land.

Kaufman, Hugh and Lynn Moorer, 1991, The Trouble with Nuclear Waste: Public Utilities Fortnightly, v. 128, no. 2, p. 16-18.

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Radioactive Material License, Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc.

Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment of 1985 to The Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 1981 (no scientific studies are sited in the amendment which supports a higher degree of scientific integrity existing on state-owned land vs. all other).
 

Linda Lynch is a founding member of the Alert Citizens for Environmental Safety (ACES), a Hudspeth County-based resistance to the siting of the nuclear landfill. She resides in Hudspeth and E Paso Counties.

The following abstracts are a compilation of various reports largely done by the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology at The University of Texas, Austin, beginning in 1986, for the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority. The first report by Krietler et al., as the initial work that investigated the area and determined that the Ft. Hancock site warranted further study. The other abstracts were published in 1990 and concluded four years of work by geologists, hydrologists, and engineers. In these abstracts one can see the problems and questions that concerned scientists as to the suitability of the Ft. Hancock site. Some of these questions addressed include:

1.characterization of groundwater flow, recharge, and discharge;

2.possible contamination of the region's groundwater supply

3.evidence of recent and ancient earthquakes in the region as shown by movement along the faults of the area; and

4.potential for future earthquake activity.

All of these issues would have a direct impact on possible leakage of the radioactive waste and contamination of groundwater. This present volume does not pretend to provide a complete geological understanding of the area to the general public. Figure 6a and Figure 6b illustrate certain features.

C.W. Kreitier, J.A. Raney, R. Nativ, E.W. Collins
W.F. Mullican, T.C. Gustavason, and C.D. Henry
July, 1986

The geology and hydrology of areas in Culberson County and Hudspeth County were studied to determine their suitability as potential sites for a low-level radioactive waste repositories. The two areas in Culberson county that were studied were wholly or partially underlain by the Permian Castile Formation and exhibited extensive solution and collapse features associated with karsting. In addition, there were extensive joint systems and localized areas of normal faulting. Surficial deposits are alluvium derived from the sandstone, limestone, gypsum, and anydrite formations and appear to be both porous and permeable. Groundwater flow is governed by the karat dissolution and collapse feature, Active recharge is through a thin unsaturated zone combined with older water flowing from the west. Residence time is short and numerous springs discharge from the shallow water table.

The area in Hudspeth County was selected by the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority on the basis of it's low relief and surface drainage into the unpopulated region of the Alamo Arroyo. This arid region (less than 10 in of precipitation per year) has about 40 ft of sands and gravels with near-surface calcrete horizons overlying a thick sequence of silty and clayey older bolson fill deposits. The clays are expansive, and selenite gypsum crystals are present at the surface. Depth to the Mesozoic bedrock is variable, but averages about 400 to 500 ft. This area lies about 4 mi northeast of the Campo Grande fault that cuts the bolson fill deposits and at last the base of the overlying alluvium. There are three regional aquifers, located within Cretaceous rocks, the Rio Grande alluvium, and the bolson fill near the area. In the site proper, no water was found in the bolson fill, and water was found in the Cretaceous aquifer at a depth of 478 ft. Water in the Cretaceous aquifer is old, suggesting either that the water movement is very slow or that this aquifer is not connected to the recharge zone at the Diablo Plateau due to faulting. There are some indicates of current recharge into the Cretaceous aquifer; however, in the bolson fill aquifer closest to the site, water is also old and may be recharged by water moving upwards from the Rio Grande. Farther away is the Rio Grande Valley, water in the bolson fill aquifer is modern and is primarily recharged by the Rio Grande alluvium aquifer. Annual recharge rates into the gravel cover that overlies the bolson fill is about 0.003 to 0.02 in/year. Groundwater flow in both the Cretaceous aquifer and the bolson fill aquifer is to the southwest toward the Rio Grande valley. The Rio Grande aquifer is fed by the river and probably discharges into the bolson fill in the valley.

From these studies it was concluded that the Culberson County sites were not suitable due to the karstic nature of the aquifers, the shallow water table, unpredictable groundwater flow directions and discharge points, and the possibility of future man-induced dissolution features due to mining and agricultural activity. The Hudspeth County site was thought more suitable because of:

1.the depth to the aquifers, the lack of any groundwater in the bolson fill,

2.the possible isolation of the Cretaceous aquifer from the Rio Grande valley due to the Campo Grande fault,

3.the long residence time of water in the aquifers (from hundreds to thousands of years),

4.the age of the groundwater near the site (8000 to 15,000 years old), and

5.the low vertical permeability resulting in slow recharge rates from rainwater (although sand lenses and faults might result in zones of higher permeability).

REGIONAL GEOLOGIC SETTING OF THE FORT HANCOCK STUDY AREA, HUDSPETH COUNTY, TEXAS

The Fort Hancock study area is located within the Basin and Range geologic province in Trans-Pecos Texas. The oldest rocks in the area are Precambrian crystalline rocks in the Hueco Mountains to the west and in isolated outcrops on the Diablo Plateau to the north. In northwestern Chihuahua, Precambrian rocks are only known from deep drilling. This is thought to be due to Precambrian faulting and subsidence southwest of a structural zone that parallels the Rio Grande. This structural zone is also coincident with younger geologic structures and has been termed the Texas Lineament.

During the early- to mid-Paleozoic, there was marine sedimentation with only mild uplift and subsidence. In the late Paleozoic, there was intense deformation and mountain building during the Ouachita-Marathon Orogeny, which uplifted areas such as the Diablo Platform. It has been suggested that this late Paleozoic time was also a time of major displacement on the Texas Lineament, although evidence is limited.

During the Mesozoic, a basin called the Chihuahua Trough developed near the southwestern edge of the Diablo Platform. The margins of this basin are thought to be along high-angle faults, most of which are inferred to exist beneath younger sedimentary strata. In the late Mesozoic and early Tertiary, there was another period of intense compressional deformation called the Laramide Orogeny, which strongly folded and faulted earlier strata with tectonic transport directions to the east and northeast, and formed structures in stable areas such as the Diablo Platform.

This compressional stress regime may have been present in the Trans-Pecos area until about 30 million years, at which time the stress regime became extensional. Magmatic activity was associated with this extension, but none is younger than 17 million years. The extension resulted in a series of basins related to the Basin and Range Province and the Rio Grande Rift. This study area lies within one of these basins, called the Hueco Basin or Hueco Bolson, and thought to be an extension of the Rio Grande Rift. Regional extension continues to the present, as is shown by Quaternary fault scarps such as the Campo Grande fault and the Amargosa fault. The Hueco bolson was filled with older lacustrine, alluvial fan, and fluvial sediments of the Fort Hancock Formation. As the Rio Grande became a through-flowing river, these older sediments were overlain by the younger fluvial sediments of the Camp Rice Formation. The Camp Rice Formation records a history of alternating stability and downcutting by the Rio Grande.

There has been intermittent deformation associated with at least some portions of the Texas Lineament from the Precambrian to the present, although major periods of activity were during the Precambrian and late Paleozoic. While not narrowly defined, the Texas Lineament is commonly projected through the Rio Grande region near the study area where it may be expressed as

• a major Precambrian discontinuity,
• the northeastern arm of the Paleozoic Maria Basin,
• the axis or eastern flank of the Mesozoic Chihuahua Trough,
• the western margin of the Diablo Platform,
• the leasing edge of the Laramide thrusting, or
• the northwest structural control on the development of the southern portion of the Hueco Bolson.

GEOMORPHOLOGY OF THE HUECO BOLSON IN THE VICINITY OF THE PROPOSED LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL SITE, HUDSPETH COUNTY, TEXAS

The study area is located on the alluvial slope between the Diablo Plateau and the Rio Grande, spanning the drainage divide between the Alamo and Camp Rice arroyos. Exposed within these arroyos are the Fort Hancock and Camp Rice Formations and younger Quaternary strata. Presently, erosion is the dominant process in these arroyos, as the arroyos cut downwards to their current levels due to base level changes in the Rio Grande and to surface rupture events where the arroyo channels cross the Campo Grande Fault. Erosional rates over the last 44 years range from 7.2 to 27.2 ft/year, although rates over the last 1330 years are much lower (0.1 to 5.2 ft/year). Depositional rates averaged over the last 1440 years are 0.0009 in/year. Prior to 7000 years ago, the rate of deposition was about ten times greater, corresponding to the onset of present drier climatic conditions 8000 years ago. Most sediment transport is caused by surface runoff following intense rainfall. Archeological evidence indicates that parts of the surface of the study area have been stable for 900 years.

Three surface fissures have formed in the study area, and an inactive, relict fracture has been exposed in one of the trenches. These fissures are due to surface collapse and piping along pre-existing tension fractures, and are as great as 4.4 ft (135 cm) deep and 5.1 ft (157 cm) wide. All are in topographic lows, indicating concentrated overland flow is essential for their development. The relict fracture is not in a topographic low now, but may have been in the past. The surface collapse features that developed over it subsequently have been removed by erosion. The source of the tensional stress producing the tension fractures is unknown, but perhaps is due to differential compaction of unconsolidated sediments over an irregular bedrock. However, compaction is commonly due to withdrawal of groundwater, and this has not occurred to any great extent in the study area. Furthermore, bedrock irregularities are buried very deep and have little local relief. There is not evidence of fault movement on these fissures.
 

GEOPHYSICAL STUDIES RELATED TO THE PROPOSED LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REPOSITORY, HUDSPETH COUNTY, TEXAS

This three-part study incorporated seismic reflection profiling, past and present earthquake studies, and gravity surveys to characterize the subsurface structure of the proposed site and determine any potential earthquake hazards. The seismic reflection studies indicated that previously described normal faults do not significantly offset Cretaceous strata and probably do not have measurable offset in the Fort Hancock Formation. What appears to be disrupted layering in the seismic sections in earlier work is thought to be sedimentologic features associated with fluvial deposition in the early stages of basin filling. A complex structural zone near the northeastern fault has been interpreted to be a thrust ramp, and appears to have flexed after loading. This might be associated with small-scale normal faulting in the early Pliocene deposits and underlies the area of fissures that occur in surficial deposits.

Seismological studies were done on the tectonic history of the region and its relation to the development of the southern Basin and Range and Rio Grande rift. Additionally, reports of all earthquakes of a magnitude 3.0 or greater within a 200 mi radius of the site were compiled. Quaternary faulting, primarily with normal dip-slip movement, is common throughout the Trans Pecos area. Stress orientations confirm that the extensional stress causing these faults is still continuing. There has been a moderate level of earthquake activity in the region. There are three major areas of seismicity: 1) the oil and gas fields of the Permian Basin, 2) the region near the Mayfield fault, site of the 1931 magnitude 6.4 Valentine, Texas, earthquake, and 3) a region of Chihuahua 50 to 100 mi south of the study area. The 1931 Valentine earthquake did not rupture the surface; however, a magnitude 7.2 event in 1887 produced extensive ground rupture and damage approximately 200 mi from the proposed site. This 1887 event is a good example of the type of earthquake that might be expected to occur along the Amargosa Fault only 15 mi from the proposed site. The Valentine event represents a background event that might be expected to occur anywhere within the region, even directly beneath the study area, and leave no surficial geologic expression of its occurrence. Earthquake monitoring shows an extremely low level of activity, with only three earthquakes within a 21 month period. Only one earthquake could be associated with the Campo Grande fault. The low level of seismic activity does not indicate the faults in the area are not active. For at least 20 years the faults near the 1983 Borah Peak, Idaho earthquake were quiescent at the magnitude 3.5 and greater level. The geologic record of surface faulting indicates earthquakes with magnitudes of 7.4 have occurred on the Campo Grande and Amargosa faults. A background event of magnitude 6.5, producing no surface rupture, might also occur within the vicinity of the proposed site. Although a large earthquake along the Amargosa fault is farther from the site, it would produce the greatest duration of shaking. Any waste disposal facility built at the proposed site should be capable of withstanding the duration of shaking from a large earthquake (up to 8.8 seconds) along the Amargosa fault.

Gravity studies yielded additional information on the nature of the faults in the area and the general subsurface structures. The Campo Grande fault is seen as a major deep-seated feature whose movement is down to the southwest. Gravity measurements indicate the throw along ttte fault decreases southeastwards. The proposed site appears to be within an inferred basin that extends southeastwards toward Campo Grande Mountain, but the gravity anomalies do not correlate well within known bedrock depths, indicating the presence of a deeper structure. Geophysical modeling shows basin fill thickening abruptly southwest of the Campo Grande fault. The structural high block just north of this fault involves basement rocks. Because of the known shallow structure, this basement high is probably not due to the Rio Grande rift, and is consistent with the idea that the Campo Grande fault has some pro-rift movement. There are several midCenozoic intrusions in the area, and it is interesting to speculate that one of these pre-rift intrusions used the Campo Grande fault as a conduit.

DESCRIPTION AND QUATERNARY HISTORY OF THE CAMPO GRANDE FAULT OF THE HUECO BASIN, HUDSPETH AND EL PASO COUNTIES, TRANS-PECOS TEXAS

The Hueco Basin of Trans-Pecos, Texas and Chihuahua, Mexico,. formed due to Basin and Range extensional stresses that began about 24 million years and continue to the present. The southeastern arm of the basin is assymetrical with the thickest sediments deposited along the fault bounded basin axis near the southwestern flank. The Campo Grande fault, about 12 km from the northeastern basin edge, is a 45 km long series of at least 17 an echelon normal faults that strike northwest and dip to the southwest. It divides the central deeper part of the basin from the shallower northeastern flank. Another major northwest-striking fault, the Amargosa fault, dips to the northeast and bounds the southwestern basin margin in Mexico.

There has been mostly dip-slip movement, as shown by a few presewed scarps of heights between 1.5 and 11.5 m and slopes of 4 to 17 degrees. Scarp heights do not accurately indicate amounts of fault offset, because sediments commonly cover the faulted horizon in the hanging wall. These scarps may be as old as late or middle Pleistocene. Successively younger units show less displacement, with maximum vertical offset about 10 m. The average recurrence of faults is 100,000 years (maximum), and the last faulting episode was in the late Pleistocene. One particular fault strand with vertical separations of 1 to 2 m indicated at least five episodes of movement, deposition and surface stabilization during the last 600,000 to 400,000 years. Maximum vertical offset during the first faulting event was about 1 to 1.5 m. Older vertical offsets dated at 44 million years, 10 million years, and 3 million years, indicate that the average rates of movement have been relatively constant over the last 2.48 million years.

HYDROLOGIC CHARACTERIZATION OF GROUNDWATER RESOURCES IN SOUTH-CENTRAL HUDSPETH COUNTY, TEXAS

Groundwater in the study area is found in Hueco Bolson silts and sands at depths of 361 ft (1 00 m) and 478 ft (1 46 m), and at depths of 592 ft (1 80 m) in Cretaceous age limestones. The unsaturated zone consists of 50 ft (1 5 in) of alluvial silt, sand, and gravel underlain by up to 500 ft (152 m) of lacustrine and fluvial clay, silt, and fine sand. Development of groundwater resources in the area is limited by the high cost of drilling wells to depths greater than 400 ft and by the low productivity of the aquifer. Studies indicate that groundwater is recharged on the Diablo Plateau and flows to the south and southwest to the Rio Grande beneath the bolson pediment. There are three aquifer units: 1) the Diablo Plateau aquifer, 2) the Hueco bolson silt and sand aquifer, and 3) the Rio Grande alluvium aquifer. Those three aquifers are likely to be hydrologically connected. Main controls on the regional flow pattern, as determined by steady state numerical flow modeling, are:

1.greater recharge in the eastern Diablo Plateau then towards the west,

2.high permeability of Cretaceous strata along the Campo Grande fault

3.high permeability of bolson deposits along the basin axis north of the Campo Grande fault, which are separated from the Cretaceous strata by a low permeability area, and

4.displacement of permeable Cretaceous strata at the central part of the Campo Grande fault against bolson deposits to the south, which acts as a low permeability zone for groundwater flow towards the Rio Grande.

This inferred distribution of permeability zones focuses groundwater flow from the eastern Diablo Plateau towards Cretaceous outcrops along the Campo Grande fault, creating an observed potentiometric high. Water chemistry data support his inferred flow pattern, although there are some discrepancies that can be related to incision of the Rio Grande during the Quaternary.

GROUNDWATER HYDROCHEMISTRY IN THE SOUTHEASTERN HUECO BOLSON AND SOUTHWESTERN DIABLO PLATEAU, TRANS-PECOS, TEXAS

The Hueco Belson and Diablo Plateau aquifers contain mostly sodium-sulfate due to dissolution of calcite, gypsum, and dolomite, and to exchange of aqueous calcium and magnesium for sodium on clay minerals and other ion exchange sites. Rio Grande groundwater is dominated by sodium and chloride derived from dissolution of salts precipitated in irrigated fields during times of high evaporation. Wells were sampled over a three year period and quarterly sampling of selected wells did not indicate any short-term variability.

Rio Grande waters are the youngest, reflecting the short flow paths from the river to wells. Young groundwaters are also found in the Diablo Plateau aquifer and near the toe of the plateau escarpment, inferred to be due to recharge along fractures. Other groundwater samples from the Diablo Plateau and Hueco Bolson aquifers are as much as 28,000 years old. While ages do not vary uniformly, oldest waters tend to be found near the center of the bolson pediment, generally conforming to salinity distribution, suggesting a systematic relationship between residence time, chemical composition, and the regional hydrologic properties of the aquifers.

ANALYSIS OF UNSATURATED FLOW BASED ON PHYSICAL DATA RELATED TO LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL, CHIHUAHUAN DESERT, TEXAS

Unsaturated flow in the Chihuahuan Desert was analyzed to evaluate the suitability of this region for low-level radioactive waste disposal because thick unsaturated zones that have low moisture fluxes in and regions are considered suitable for radioactive waste disposal. The absence of variations in moisture content in deep profiles over time indicated that recharge pulses are not moving through the system. Low moisture contents are characterized of the shallow coarse-grained material and high moisture contents are characteristic of the deeper clays. The surficial sediments are only 10-20% saturated, while the deeper clays are close to saturation. Penetration of moisture after rainfall was restricted to the uppermost meter of the unsaturated zone because of the fine grain size, large porosity, and low degree of saturation of the surficial sediments. Low measured water potentials indicate the system is very dry. Except in the shallow subsurface after precipitation events, water potentials generally decreased upward. This trend indicated primarily upward flow under isothermal conditions, probably controlled by evapotranspiration. Numerical analyses of potential leakage indicated that the direction as well as the net rate of water movement is controlled by soil layering. Simulations of downward leaking rates showed that a saturated zone will develop at the contact between the shallow coarse material and underlying clays.

STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS FOR PROPOSED FORT HANCOCK LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL SITE (NTP-S34), SOUTHERN HUDSPETH COUNTY, TEXAS -- AAPG Bulletin, vol. 73, no. 3, p. 380.; February 1988

Structural complexities reduce the homogeneity necessary for a site characterization model to an unacceptable level for performance assessment for radioactive waste disposal sites. The proposed site lies between the northern, stable Diablo platform and the southern, mobile Mesozoic Chihuahua tectonic beft. Structural movement along this interface has been active for the past l.4 Ga*. In addition, the area lies along the northern margin of the Permian Marfa basin and the northeastern margin of the deeply faulted Hueco bolson segment of the late Cenozoic Rio Grande rift system. Recent seismic activity with extensive surface rupture in Quitman Canyon (30 ml southeast of the site) is also documented from the 1931 Valentine, Texas, earthquake (6.4 Richter scale). The site is underlain by either a thrust fault or the complex terminus of a Mesozoic thrust fault. This fault is a segment of the continuous thrust sheet extending from exposures in the Sierra Blanca area, 30 ml east (Devil Ridge fault), to the El Paso area west (Rio Grande fault). This segment of the Devil Ridge-Rio Grande thrust is documented by the Haymond Krupp No. 1 Thaxton wildcat drilled at Campogrande Mountain immediately south of the site. The recent rift fault scarp (Campo Grande) immediately south of Thaxton well has a 17 mi surface trace and is, no doubt, related to the subsurface Clint fault to the west in the El Paso area. An additional complexity is the presence of a monoclinal flexure with a minimum of 900 ft of surface relief (2 ml northeast of NTP-S34). A 4.5 mi, east-west, down-to-the-south normal fault occurs near the top of the monocline with a small associated graben. These complexities seriously comprise the proposed Fort Hancock site.

*Abstract, Erratum. Corrected 1.4 G.A. as originally submitted. AAPG Bulletin, vol. 73, no. 9, p. 1141.

Part of the initial intent of this effort was to undertake a fieldtrip to the Fort Hancock area where the burial of the low-level nuclear waste of Texas was proposed. Although there was not an abundance of interesting features to see, there were some, a large "test pit", a pit into one of the ground fissures, the general lay of the land, and the 100-year flood scenario. During the planning stages, however, Governor Ann Richards unilaterally terminated the proposed Fort Hancock site, and moved the study site 50 mi further east. Furthermore, the interesting pits are being back filled, providing even less to see. A field trip to the Fort Hancock site has consequently been eliminated, but a brief field guide has been included for historical purposes. For reasons as to why the publication of this booklet was continued, see the introduction.

The field trip consists of a 15 mi excursion on good dirt roads, beginning at exit 72, Fort Hancock, off of 1-1 0, 35 mi east of the present El Paso city boundary.

Mileage

0.0	Texaco Food Mart at the west side of the interstate interchange. Go east over overpass.
0.3	Dirt road heading east through low sandy hills.
1.9	Overview of the region. Diablo Platform is in view to the east, Sierra San Ignacio to the west, and the Quitman Mountains and Sierra Blanca to the southeast.
2.3	Road intersection; continue straight.
2.4	Cattle -guard.
2.8	Road intersection, continue straight.
3.8	Cattle guard.
5.2 .	Cattle guard
6.1	Road intersection; continue straight.
6.2	Cattle guard. This is the area underlain by the Campo Grande fault; the slight hill rising to the east between 6.0 and 6.4 may be considered it's surface expression.
6.9	Road intersection; continue straight.
7.8	Blue, metal, water tank 1 00 yards off the road to the south.
8.6	Small road intersection; continue straight.
9.0	Large test pit for low-level nuclear waste disposal was 50 yds south of this point. Pit was carefully described in the scientific literature but is now being refilled.
9.3 .	Road intersection; continue straight
9.6 .	Road intersection; continue straight
9.7	200 yds south of here was test pit into surface fissure, but is now being refilled.
10.5	Cattle guard and road intersection; continue straight
12.0	Ruins of abandoned house and wind mill. Take road which veers slightly to the right.
2.1	Fence.
12.7	Road begins to climb the west-dipping monoclinal flexure onto the Diablo Plateau.
12.8	Quarry in limestone.
13.1	Cattle guard.
15.0	Cattle guard and road intersection. You have reached the Diablo Plateau. Nearby is an excellent view to the south and west over the route you have just driven.
	Return to 1-1 0 the way you have come.

actinide series:

The series of elements beginning with actinium, element No. 89, and continuing through lawrencium, element No. 103, which together occupy one position in the periodic table. The series includes uranium, element No. 92, and all the man-made transuranium elements. The group is also referred to as the "actinides."

activation:

The process of making a material radioactive by bombardment with neutrons, protons, or other nuclear particles. Also called "radioactivation".

activity:

A measure of the rate at which a material is emitting nuclear radiations; usually given in terms of the number of nuclear disintegrations occurring in a given quantity of material over a  unit of time; the standard unit of activity is the curie (Ci), which is equal to 3.7 x 10 degrees disintegrations per second.

air sampling:

The collection and analysis of samples of air to measure its radioactivity or to detect the presence of radioactive substances.

alluvial fan:
    An outspread, gently sloping mass of alluvium deposited by a stream, especially in an arid or   semiarid region where a stream issues from a narrow canyon onto a plain or valley floor. Viewed from above, ft has the shape of an open fan, the apex being the valley mouth. Cf: bajada.

alluvium:

A general term for detrital deposits made by streams on river beds, flood plains, and alluvial fans; esp. a deposit of silt or silty clay laid down during time of flood. The term applies to stream deposits of recent time. It does not include subaqueous sediments of seas and lakes.

alpha waste:

Waste material that is contaminated by radionuclides that emit alpha particles, particularly the transuranium elements.

aquifer:

A subsurface formation or geological unit containing sufficient saturated permeable material to yield significant quantities of water.

arroyo:

1) A term applied in the arid and semiarid southwestern U.S. to a small deep flat-floored channel or gully of an ephemeral or intermittent stream, It is usually dry and has steep or vertical banks of unconsolidated material. 2) The intermittent stream that occupies such a channel. - Ethymol: Spanish, "Stream, gutter".

bolson:

A term applied in the desert regions of the southwest U.S. to an extensive flat alluvium-floored depression, into which drainage from the surrounding mountains flows toward a central playa; an interior basin, or a basin with internal drainage. Etymol: Spanish, "large purse".

Cenozoic:

The latest of the four eras into which geologic time is divided; it extends from the close of the Mesozoic Era, about 65 million years ago, to the present. The Cenozoic Era is subdivided into Tertiary and Quaternary periods, or, on a different basis, into Paleogene and Neogene periods. Syn: Cainozoic.

cladding waste:

Fuel rods in most nuclear reactors today are made up of fissionable materials clad in a protective alloy sheathing that is relatively resistant to radiation and the physical and chemical conditions that prevail in a reactor core. The spent fuel rods, after removal from the reactor and storage to permit radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products, are removed and in certain fuel cycle systems are chopped up, and the residues of the fissionable materials are leached out chemically. The remaining residues, principally the now radioactivated cladding material (zirconium alloys, etc.) and insoluble residues of nuclear fuel, fission products, and transuranium nuclides, are left behind as cladding waste, which is a special category of transuranium radioactive waste.

Cretaceous:

The final period of Mesozoic era (after the Jurassic and before the Tertiary period of the Cenozoic era), thought to have covered the span of time between 135 and 65 million years ago; also, the corresponding system of rocks. It is named after the Latin word for chalk ("creta') because of the English chalk beds of this age.

critical:

The condition in which a material is undergoing nuclear fission at a self-sustaining rate: the critical mass of a material is the amount that will self-sustain nuclear fission when placed in an optimum arrangement in its present form; the minimum critical mass is the amount of a fissile isotope that will self-sustain nuclear fission when placed in optimum conditions.

curie (Ci):

A unit of radioactivity defined as the amount of a radioactive material that has an activity of 3.7 x 10¹⁰ disintegrations per second (d/s); millicurie (mCi) = 1^-3 curies; microcurie (µCi)=10^-8 curies; nanocurie (nCi) = 19^-9 curies; picocurie (pCi) = 10^-12 curies; femtocurie (fCi) =10^-15 curies.

decommissioning:

The process of removing a facility or area from operation and decontaminating and/or disposing of it or placing it in a condition of standby with appropriate controls and safeguards.

decontamination:

The planned release or placement of waste in a manner that precludes recovery.

engineered storage:

The storage of radioactive wastes, usually in suitable sealed containers, into any of a variety of structures especially designed to protect them from water and weather and to help keep them from leakage to the biosphere by accident or sabotage. They may also provide for extracting heat of radioactive decay from the waste.

environmental surveillance:

A program to monitor the impact on the surrounding region of the discharges from the industrial operations.

fertile material:

A material, not itself fissionable by thermal neutrons, that can be converted into a fissile material by irradiation in a reactor. There are two basic fertile materials, uranium²³⁸ and thorium²³². When these fertile materials capture neutrons, they are partially converted into fissile plutonium²³⁹ and uranium²⁵⁵, respectively.

fissile material:

While sometimes used as synonym for fissionable material, this term has also acquired a more restricted meaning, namely, any material fissionable by neutrons of all energies, including (and especially) thermal (slow) neutrons as well as fast neutrons; for example, uranium²³⁵ and plutonium²³⁹.

fission:

The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two approximately equal parts (which are nuclei of lighter elements), accompanied by the release of a relatively large amount of energy and generally one or more neutrons. Fission can occur spontaneously, but usually is caused by nuclear absorption of gamma rays, neutrons, or other particles.

fissionable material:

Commonly used as a synonym for fissile material. The meaning of this term also has been extended to include material that can be fissioned by fast neutrons only, such as uranium-238. Used in reactor operations to mean fuel.

fission products:

The nuclei (fission fragments) formed by the fission of heavy elements, plus the nuclides formed by the fission fragments' radioactive decay.

fissure:

1) An extensive crack, break, or fracture in the rocks. It may contain mineral-bearing material, 2) crevasse.

fluvial:

Of or pertaining to rivers; growing or living in a stream or river; produced by the action of a stream or river.

fuel (nuclear, reactor):

Fissionable material used as the source of power when placed in a critical arrangement in a nuclear reactor.

fuel cycle:

The complete series of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear power reactors. It includes mining, refining, the original fabrication of fuel elements, their use in a reactor, chemical processing to recover the fissionable material remaining in the spent fuel, re-enrichment of the fuel material, refabrication into new fuel elements, and management of radioactive waste.

fuel separation (fuel reprocessing):

Processing of irradiated (spent) nuclear reactor fuel to recover useful materials as separate products, usually separation into plutonium, uranium, and fission products.

groundwater:

Water that exists or flows below the surface (within the zone of saturation).

half-life:

The time in which half the atoms of a particular radioactive substance disintegrate to another nuclear form. Measured half-lives vary from millionths of a second to billions of years. After a period of time equal to 10 half-lives, the radioactivity of a radionuclide has decreased to 0.1 percent of its original level.

health physics:

The science concerned with recognition, evaluation, and control of health hazards from ionizing and nuclear radiations.

high-efficiency particulate air filter (HEPA):

An air filter capable of removing at least 99.97% of the particulate material in an air system.

high-level liquid waste:

The aqueous waste resulting from the operation of the first-cycle extraction system, equivalent concentrated wastes from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent wasted from a process not using solvent extraction, in a facility for processing irradiated reactor fuels. This is the legal definition used by ERDA; another definition used at the ERDA Hanford Reservation for its waste, is: fluid materials, disposed of by storage In underground tanks that are contaminated by greater than 100 microcuries/millititer of mixed fission products or more than 2 microcuries/milliliter of cesium^-137, strontium^-90, or long-lived alpha emitters.

hot spot:

A surface area of higher-than-average radioactivity. Also a part of a fuel element surface that has become overheated.

intermediate-level liquid waste:

Fluid materials, disposed as a result of Hanford operations, which contain form 5 x 10⁵ microcuries/milliliter to 100 microcuries/milliliter of mixed fission products, including less than 2 microcuries/milliliter of cesium^-137, strontium^-90, or long-lived alpha emitters.

ion exchange:

A chemical process involving the reversible interchange of various ions between a solution and a solid material, usually a plastic or a resin. It is used to separate and purify chemicals, such as fission products, rare earths, in solution.

ionizing radiation:

Any radiation displacing electrons from atoms or molecules, thereby producing Ions. Examples: alpha, beta, and gamma radiation, shortwave ultraviolet light. Ionizing radiation may produce severe skin or tissue damage.

isotope:

One of two or more atoms with the same atomic number (the same chemical element) but with different atomic weights. An equivalent statement is that the nuclei of isotopes have the same number of protons but different numbers of neutrons. Isotopes usually have very nearly the same chemical properties, but somewhat different physical properties.

joint:

A surface of fracture or parting in a rock, without displacement; the surface is often plane and may occur with parallel joints to form a joint set.

karat:

A type of topography that is formed over limestone, dolomite, or gypsum by dissolution, and that is characterized by sinkholes, caves, and underground drainage.

lacustrine:

1) Pertaining to, produced by, or inhabiting a lake or lakes, e.g. "lacustrine sands" or a "lacustrine fauna". 2) Said of a region characterized by lakes. - Cf: limnic. Syn: lacustral; lacustrian.

licensed material:

Source material, special nuclear material, or by-product material received, possessed, used, or transferred under a general or special license issued by the U.S, Energy Research and Development Administration or a state.

loess:

A homogeneous, nonstratified, unindurated sediment, largely silt, deposited primarily by the wind.

long-lived isotope:

A radioactive nuclide that decays at such a slow rate that a quantity of it will exist for an extended period, usually radionuclides whose half-life is greater than 3 years.

low-level liquid waste:

Fluid materials that are microcuries/milliliter of mixed fission products.

man-rem:

A unit used in health physics to compare the effects of different amounts of radiation on groups of people. It is obtained by multiplying the average dose equivalent to a given organ or tissue (measured in rems, which see) by the number of persons in that population.

Mesozoic:

An era of geologic time, from the end of the Paleozoic to the beginning of the Cenozoic, or from about 225 to about 65 million years ago; also, the rocks formed during that era. ft includes the Triassic, Jurassic, and Cretaceous periods.

normal fault:

A fault in which the hanging wall appears to have moved downward relative to the footwall. The angle of dip is usually 45-90 degrees. Cf: thrust fault. Syn: gravity fault; slump fault.

nuclide:

A species of atom having a specific mass, atomic number, and nuclear energy state. These factors determine the other properties of the element, including its radioactivity.

orogeny:

Literally, the process of formation of mountains. In present usage, orogeny is the process by which structures within fold-belt mountainous areas were formed, including thrusting, folding, and faulting In the outer and higher layers, and the outer and higher layers, and plastic folding, metamorphism, and plutonism in the inner and deeper layers. Only In the very youngest, late Cenozoic mountains is there any evident causal relation between rock structure and surface landscape.

Paleozoic:

An era of geologic time, from the end of the Precambrian to the beginning of the Mesozoic, or from about 470 to about 225 million years ago. Also, the erathem of rocks deposited during the Paleozoic.

partitioning:

The process of separating liquid waste into two or more fractions.

permeability:

1. The capacity of a porous rock, sediment, or soil for transmitting a fluid; it is a measure of the relative case of fluid flow under unequal pressure. the customary unit of measurement is the millidarcy. Cf: absolute permeability; effective permeability; relative permeability. Adj: permeable. 2. The ratio of magnetic induction B to inducing field strength H.

pH:

A measure of the relative acidity or alkalinity of solution; a neutral solution has a pH of 7; acids have pH's of 7 to 1; bases have pH's of 7 to 14.

Pleistocene:

An epoch of the quaternary period, after the Pliocene of the Tertiary and before the Holocene; also, the corresponding worldwide series of rocks. It began two to three million years ago and lasted until the start of the Holocene some 8,000 years ago. When the Quaternary is designated as an era, the Pleistocene is considered to be a period. Syn: ice age; glacial epoch,

Pliocene:

An epoch of the Tertiary period, after the Miocene and before the Pleistocene; also, the corresponding world-wide series of rocks. It is considered to be a period when the Tertiary is designated as an era.

plutonium:

A heavy, radioactive, man-made, metallic element with atomic number 94. Its most important isotope is fissionable plutonium^-239, produced by neutron irradiation of uranium^-238. ft is used for reactor fuel and in weapons.

porosity:

The ratio of the aggregate volume of interstices in a rock or soil to its total volume. It is usually stated as a percentage: Cf: effective porosity: Syn: total porosity.

Quaternary:

The second period of the Cenozoic era, following the Tertiary; also, the corresponding system of rocks. It began two to three million years ago and extends to the present. It consists of two grossly unequal epochs: the Pleistocene, up to about 8,000 years ago, and the Holocene since that time. The Quaternary may also be incorporated into the Neogene, when the Neogene is designated as a period of the Tertiary era.

rad (acronym for radiation absorbed dose):

The basic unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation. A dose of 1 red means the absorption of 100 ergs of radiation energy per gram of absorbing material.

radiation:

The emission and propagation of energy through matter or space by means of electromagnetic disturbances, which display both wave-like and particle-like behavior; in this context the "particles" are known as photons. Also, the energy so propagated. The term has been extended to include streams of fast-moving particles (alpha and beta particles, free neutrons, cosmic radiation, etc.). Nuclear radiation is that emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear reactions, including alpha, beta, and gamma radiation and neutrons.

radiation survey:

Evaluation of  area or object with instruments in order to detect, identify, and quantify radioactive materials and radiation fields present.

radioactive contamination:

Deposition of radioactive material in any place where it may harm persons, spoil experiments, or make products or equipment unsuitable or unsafe for some specific use. The presence of unwanted radioactive matter. Also radioactive material found on the walls of vessels in used-fuel processing plants, or radioactive material that has leaked into a reactor coolant. Often referred to only as contamination.

radioactivity (often shortened to "activity'):

The spontaneous decay or disintegration of an unstable atomic nucleus, usually accompanied by the emission of ionizing radiation. The word radioactivity is often used to refer to radioactive materials or radioactive nuclides, but this usage is not, strictly speaking, correct. Radioactivity is a process, not a substance.

radioisotope:

A radioactive isotope. An unstable isotope of an element that decays or disintegrates spontaneously, emitting radiation. More than 1,300 natural and artificial radioisotopes have been identified.

Waste materials that are contaminated with radioactive materials.

The processes involved in the addition of water to ttle zone of saturation; also, the amount of water added. Syn: intake.

A unit of measure for dose of ionizing radiation that gives the same biological effect as 1 roentgen of X rays; 1 rem equals approximately 1 red for X, gamma, or beta radiation.

A unit or exposure to ionizing radiation. It is that amount of gamma or X rays required to produce ions carrying 1 electrostatic unit of electrical charge (either positive or negative)in 1 cubic centimeter of dry air under standard conditions. Named after Wilhelm Roentgen, German scientist who discovered X rays in 1895.

An artificial body of surface water formed by discharge of liquid waste.

A radioactive nuclide that decays so rapidly that a given quantity is transformed into its daughter products within a short period (usually those with a half-life of days or less).

A means of measuring loose surface contamination on an object by wiping it with paper, gauze, etc., and then measuring the disintegrations per minute on the wipe with an instrument.

Either solid radioactive material or solid objects that contain radioactive material or bear radioactive surface contamination.

Plutonium, uranium^-255, uranium^-235, or uranium enriched to a higher percentage than normal of the 255 or 235 isotopes.

The deposition and attachment of radioactive materials to a surface.

Any portable radiation detection instrument especially adapted for surveying or inspecting an area to establish the existence and amount of radioactive material present.

An installation of interconnected underground containers (tanks) for storage of high-level waste.

A large metal container located underground for storage of liquid wastes.

Of, pertaining to, or designating the rock structures resulting from deformation of the earth's crust.

The first period of the Cenozoic era (after the Cretaceous of the Mesozoic era and before the Quaternary), thought to have covered the span of time between 65 million and 2 million years ago; also, the corresponding system of rocks. It is divided into five epochs: The Paleocene, Eocene, Oligocene, Miocene, and Pliocene. It was originally designated an era rather than a period; in this sense, it may be considered to have either five periods (Paleocene, Eocene, Oligocene. Miocene, Pliocene) or two (Paleogene and Neogene), with the Pleistocene and Holocene included in the Neogene.

transmissivity:

A coefficient relating the volumetric flow through a unit width of groundwater to the driving force (hydraulic potential); a function of both the porous medium, fluid properties, and saturated thickness of the aquifer.

Nuclides having an atomic number greater than that of uranium (i.e.,greater than 92). The principal transuranium radionuclides of concern in radioactive waste management are tabulated below with their half-lives:

The transuranium nuclide produced in largest amounts is plutonium^-239; americum^-241 is also produced in significant amounts. One system of classification used at Oak Ridge includes uranium^-255 (162,000 year half-life, alpha decay) among the transuranium isotopes, although strictly speaking this is not accurate.

unsaturated zone or vadose zone:

The subsurface zone designated to be above the saturated zone.

uranium:

A radioactive element with the atomic number 92 and, as found in natural ores, an average atomic weight of approximately 238. The two principal natural isotopes are uranium^-235 (0.7 percent of natural uranium), which is fissionable, and uranium^-238 (99.3 percent of natural uranium), which is fertile. Natural uranium also includes a minute amount of uranium^-234. Uranium is the basic raw material of nuclear energy.

vadose zone:

The unsaturated region of soil between the ground surface and the water table.

water table:

Upper boundary of an unconfined aquifer surface below which saturated groundwater occurs; defined by the levels at which water stands in wells that barely penetrate the aquifer.

zone of saturation:

A subsurface zone In which all the interstices are filled with water under pressure greater than that of the atmosphere. Although the zone may contain gas-filled interstices or interstices filled with fluids other than water, it is still considered saturated. This zone is separated from the overlying zone of aeration by the water table. Syn: saturated zone; phreatic zone.